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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1978, when Bennett Cohen and Jerry Greenfield invested 
$12,000 in an ice cream venture and started selling ice cream from a 
renovated gas station in Burlington, Vermont, they did not envision 
that only six years later, they would be generating $4 million in 
annual sales.1 Ben & Jerry’s reputation as a company with a quality 
product and a dual mission of social conscience and profit kept them 
both in the headlines and profitable. To expand their operations, 
Bennett and Jerry sold shares to the public in 1984 and 1985.2 In 
2000, Unilever offered to buy the company at $43.60 per share (for a 
total sale price of $326 million)— a bid well above the competing 
take-over bids for the company.3 While Bennett and Jerry had 
reservations about whether a parent company such as Unilever would 
stay true to the social-minded ideals the pair had worked hard to 
maintain, they believed that they had a duty to maximize shareholder 
value by accepting the take-over bid.4 
According to Greenfield, “[i]t was a very difficult time. But we 
were a public company, and the Board of Directors’ primary 
responsibility is the interest of the shareholder. So that is what the 
decision came down to. It was extremely difficult, heart-wrenching.”5 
In the year 2000, there was no for-profit hybrid business model 
available to social-minded business owners that would provide them 
with an affirmative duty to consider the interests of stakeholders, 
rather than just shareholders, in their corporate decision-making. But 
today, in a growing number of states, that problem has changed. A 
new form of hybrid business, known as the Benefit Corporation, 
would have provided Ben & Jerry’s with the focus its founders sought. 
The Benefit Corporation allows corporate directors to consider 
 
1  Lauren Folino, The Great Leaders Series: Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield, Co-founders 
of Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, INC.COM (Feb. 18, 2010), 
http://www.inc.com/30years/articles/ben-and-jerry.html.  
2  Anthony Page & Robert Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale 
of a Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 218-19 (2010). 
3  Dan Gallagher, Dryer’s Loses Ben & Jerry’s Ice Cream Bid to Unilever, SAN FRANCISCO 
BUS. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2000 9:00pm PDT), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/eastbay/stories/2000/04/17/story2.html. 
4  Page, supra note 2, at 229. 
5  Hannah Pool, Question Time with Hannah Pool, GUARDIAN (July 31, 2008), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/jul/31/5. 
ARTICLE_ALEXANDER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/9/2014  1:57 PM 
222 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 38:2 
 
social missions and objectives, as well as profits, in carrying out their 
fiduciary duties.  Benefit Corporations provide shareholders with 
“additional rights to hold directors accountable for failure to create 
material positive impact on society or to consider the impact of 
decisions on employees, community, and the [local and global] 
environment.”6 While Benefit Corporations are relatively new and 
untested entities, they hold great promise for encouraging and 
allowing an increasing number of companies to operate with a focus 
not only on profits but also on the impact of company actions on a 
broad array of stakeholders. 
Maryland was the first state to pass Benefit Corporation 
legislation in April of 2010.7 Since that time, the District of Columbia 
and an additional twenty-five states have passed similar legislation.8 
Benefit Corporation legislation is also pending in twelve other states.9 
Currently, Benefit Corporations do not receive any preferred federal 
tax treatment. 
The purpose of this Article is twofold: (1) placing the Benefit 
Corporation within the historical context of the social enterprise 
movement in the United States, and (2) considering whether Benefit 
Corporations should qualify for the preferred tax treatment given to 
nonprofit organizations. Part II of this Article explores the evolution 
of the social enterprise movement and the path leading to the hybrid 
entity’s rise in the United States. Part III provides a closer look at the 
legal requirements imposed on Benefit Corporations. Part IV outlines 
the requirements that must be met for a nonprofit organization to 
qualify for tax benefits and the rationale behind such benefits. Part V 
 
6  Press Release, The Corporate Social Responsibility Newswire: Maryland First State in 
Union to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation (Apr. 14, 2010 10:57 AM EST), 
http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/29332-Maryland-First-State-in-Union-to-Pass-
Benefit-Corporation-Legislation.  
7  Id.  
8  These include: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. See State by State 
Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP. INFORMATION CENTER, http://benefitcorp.net/state-
by-state-legislative-status. http://benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status 
(legislation that has been passed in Connecticut, Florida, and New Hampshire is still 
awaiting the signature of the governor). 
9  These include: Alaska, Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, Ohio, and Wisconsin. See id. 
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addresses whether the tax benefits made available to nonprofit 
organizations should be extended to Benefit Corporations. This 
Article concludes that although the Benefit Corporation represents a 
natural progression in the evolution of social enterprise, its 
organizational and operational structure does not provide sufficient 
grounds for extending special tax treatment to these organizations. 
II. THE HYBRID ENTITY EVOLVED FROM THE SOCIAL 
ENTERPRISE MOVEMENT 
In 1970, Milton Friedman assured us: “There is one and only 
one social responsibility of business— to use its resources and engage 
in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within 
the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free 
competition without deception or fraud.”10 In 1984, R. Edward 
Freeman wrote a book called Strategic Management: A Stakeholder 
Approach, which popularized the phrase “stakeholder theory” and the 
idea that a corporation should consider the ramifications of its 
actions, not just on its shareholders, but on all those impacted by 
corporate decisions.11 Several years later, in 2005, Whole Foods CEO 
John Mackey offered the following perspective: “Someday businesses 
like Whole Foods which adhere to a stakeholder model of a deeper 
business purpose will dominate the economic landscape. Wait and 
see.”12 In his 2009 Encyclical Letter, Caritas in Veritate, Pope Benedict 
XVI considered the relationship between business and ethics and 
concluded that “the traditionally valid distinction between profit-
based companies and nonprofit organizations can no longer do full 
justice to reality or offer practical direction for the future,” and called 
for the recognition of “a broad new composite reality embracing the 
public and private spheres, one which does not exclude profit, but 
 
10  Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (Sept. 13, 1970), 
http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-
business.html. 
11  R. Edward Freeman, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 47-8 
(2010).  
12  Rethinking the Social Responsibility of Business, REASON MAG. (Oct. 2005), 
http://reason.com/archives/2005/10/01/rethinking-the-social-
responsi/singlepage. 
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instead considers it a means for achieving human and social ends.”13 
At present, we increasingly find ourselves moving away from the 
Friedman approach and toward the John Mackey view of the role of 
the corporation. The 2008 financial crisis having global 
repercussions, the distrust of Wall Street resulting from the crisis, and 
the seemingly never-ending headlines of a new corporate scandal 
have caused many people to question and rethink the proper role of 
the corporation.14 Should corporations be purely profit driven 
entities, first and foremost serving the financial interest of 
shareholders? Not surprisingly, in the United States, this very 
question has been brought to the forefront. Co-founder of B-Lab Jay 
Gilbert has addressed this, “With public trust in business at an all 
time low, [benefit corporations] represent the first systemic response 
to the underlying problems that created the financial crisis.”15 State 
legislatures and their constituents who recognize the value of the 
expansion of the corporate social conscience have increasingly 
accepted the Benefit Corporation. Although recent events have 
certainly accelerated the acceptance of these hybrid entities, the 
concept of this business model has been many years in the making. 
 
13  Pope Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter, Caritas in Veritate ¶ 46 (June 29, 2009), 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate_en.html. This Encyclical attracted the attention 
of the international media according to Bill Moyers Journal. See The Pope’s Encyclical: 
Charity in Truth, July 7, 2009, 
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/07032009/profile4.html (citing the following 
examples of international media attention: Pope Calls for God-Centered Global Economy, 
USA TODAY, July 7, 2009; Post Litteram, RELIGION NEWS SERVICE, July 7, 2009; Pope 
Benedict on Economic Justice: The Catholic’s View, WASH. POST, July 7, 2009; Pope Benedict 
Appeals for Less Greed and More Soul, DEUTSCHE WELLE, July 7, 2009; Encyclical Covers 
Issues from Sex to World Economy, GUARDIAN [UK], July 7, 2009).                                                                                                    
14  See, e.g., Erik Eckholm and Timothy Williams, Anti-Wall Street Protests Spreading 
to Cities Large and Small, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/04/us/anti-wall-street-protests-spread-to-other-
cities.html?_r=0; Jesse Eisinger, Financial Crisis Suit Suggests Bad Behavior at Morgan 
Stanley, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 23, 2013), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/financial-crisis-lawsuit-suggests-bad-
behavior-at-morgan-stanley/; Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/business/economy/26inquiry.html.  
15  B CORPORATION, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (2011), 
https://www.bcorporation.net/news-media/annual-report-2011 (quoting Jay Coen 
Gilbert, co-founder of B Lab). 
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A. The Notion of Corporate Philanthropy as a Remedy for Social 
Ills Has Been in Place for Over a Century 
The notion of joining nonprofit and for-profit objectives is not 
new. Over a century ago, “beginning with the creation of The 
Carnegie Corporation in 1911 and the Rockefeller Foundation in 
1913, the modern philanthropic foundation came into existence.”16 
There was a recognition that those generating wealth had a 
responsibility to use that wealth to benefit society. Private foundations 
“arose as an institutional response to the rapid social, economic, and 
cultural changes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.”17 
Before this time, charitable efforts were generally focused on discrete 
local issues, but new foundations represented a more managerial and 
bureaucratic approach to broad social concerns.18 There are now 
approximately 2,700 corporate foundations in the United States, 
which made grants of approximately $5.2 billion in 2010.19 Today’s 
high profile foundations, such as the Bank of America Charitable 
Foundation and the GE Foundation, highlight the close relationship 
that can exist between the for-profit entity and the nonprofit 
organization.20 Moreover, nonprofit organizations might create a for-
profit enterprise to serve their purposes. For example, a nonprofit 
can set up a for-profit retailer to sell its merchandise.21 
Nonprofits have also successfully entered into joint venture 
arrangements with for-profit corporations. In Revenue Ruling 98-15, 
the IRS decided that a nonprofit organization and a for-profit 
corporation could engage in a joint venture using a Limited Liability 
Company (“LLC”) as long as the arrangement was properly 
 
16  Barry D. Karl & Stanley N. Katz, The American Private Philanthropic Foundation 
and the Public Sphere 1890-1930, 19 MINERVA 236, 246 (1981). 
17  Carl J. Schramm, Law Outside the Market: The Social Utility of Private Foundations, 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 356, 368 (2006). 
18  Id. 
19  Key Facts on Corporate Foundations August 2012, FOUNDATION CTR., 
http://foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/research/pdf/keyfacts_corp2012.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 5, 2013). 
20  The GE Foundation is the philanthropic arm of GE, 
http://www.gefoundation.com/; Bank of America’s Neighborhood Builders 
Program is the country’s “largest philanthropic investment in nonprofit leadership 
investment,” http://www.gefoundation.com/. 
21  Allen Bromberger, A New Type of Hybrid, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Spring 
2011, at 49–53. 
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structured.22 The ruling presents two scenarios, each one involving a 
nonprofit hospital that forms an LLC with a for-profit corporation.23 
The for-profit corporation provided financing for the arrangement.24 
The nonprofit contributed its hospital and other assets to the LLC 
and the LLC then operated the hospital.25 Although both scenarios 
are premised on these same basic facts, one protects the nonprofit’s 
501(c)(3) status and the other puts that status in jeopardy. The table 
below highlights the key distinctions in the two scenarios: 
Table 1: Revenue Ruling 98-15 Two Scenario Distinctions26 
Attribute Scenario One Scenario Two 
Mission 
The governing instrument 
of the LLC states that the 
hospital will be operated 
“in a manner that furthers 
charitable purposes by 
promoting health for a 
broad cross-section of its 
community.” 
The LLC’s governing 
instrument does not give 
priority to the charitable 
purposes of the exempt 
organization. 
 
Governance 
 
The exempt entity controls 
three of the five seats on the 
governing board.  The 
governing body has 
authority over major 
decisions.  Distributions to 
for-profit controlled by 
nonprofit.
The exempt provider and the 
nonprofit corporation share 
control, with each having 
the same number of seats.  
The governing body has 
authority over major 
decisions. 
 
Management 
 
The joint venture contracts 
with an independent third 
party to manage the 
hospital. 
The joint venture contracts 
with a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of the for-profit 
corporation to manage the 
hospital. 
 
The IRS’s focus on these distinctions clearly indicates that the 
overriding concern in reviewing such ventures is the degree to which 
 
22  Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-12 I.R.B. 6. 
23  Id. at 6. 
24  Id.  
25  Id.  
26  David S. Walker, Business Organizations: When “Business Purpose” Disappears: 
Article: A Consideration of an LLC for a 501(c)(3) Nonprofit Organization, 38 WM.. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 627. 
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the control and direction of the venture reflects the nonprofit 
organization’s participation. Situation two jeopardized the 
nonprofit’s tax-exempt status because control was shared, the for-
profit entity essentially managed the business, and there was no 
commitment to ensure the priority of charitable activity.27 By contrast, 
the first scenario met all the ideals of a qualifying joint venture. 
While this ruling is instructive in that it makes clear that 
nonprofits can engage in joint ventures with for-profits, it is also 
somewhat limited because it represents two extreme positions: one in 
which everything is just right, and one in which everything is just the 
opposite. Reality usually lies somewhere in between, so practitioners 
are left to evaluate the facts and circumstances of a particular 
scenario to see if the activity is permissible. 
To assist practitioners in this regard, the IRS issued Revenue 
Ruling 2004-51 to address a variation of control in the nonprofit/for-
profit venture.28 In that ruling, a nonprofit university contributed a 
portion of its assets to an LLC, through which it engaged in a joint 
venture with a for-profit corporation.29 The LLC was formed to offer 
teacher-training sessions at off-campus locations through video 
technology.30 The for-profit corporation had expertise in video 
training programs.31 The university provided the curriculum, similar 
to what it used for its on-campus summer programs.32 The nonprofit 
and for-profit organizations had an equal number of votes on the 
governing board.33 The entities divided their responsibilities as 
follows: the nonprofit university was responsible for approval of 
curriculum, training materials, and instructors, and the for-profit was 
responsible for selecting the seminar location and approving other 
necessary personnel.34 The IRS determined that this arrangement did 
not jeopardize the university’s nonprofit status, because the activities 
the university conducted through the LLC were not a substantial part 
 
27  Id. at 17-18. 
28  Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-22 I.R.B.  
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. 
32  Id. 
33  Id.  
34  Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-22 I.R.B. 
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of its activities.35 Further, the Service noted that the activities of the 
LLC were substantially related to the university’s exempt purpose, 
and therefore, would not result in taxable unrelated business income 
to the university.36 
Another area of overlap of for-profit and nonprofit entities is 
social alliance. Social alliances (relationships in which a for-profit and 
nonprofit share resources and capabilities) have proven to be 
beneficial to both entities that enter into this relationship.37 For 
example, an alliance between the Oakland Athletics baseball team 
and the Oakland Ballet Company allowed the Oakland Athletics to 
increase their community involvement while maintaining their 
visibility during the off-season.38 The alliance also caused an increase 
in ticket sales for the Oakland Ballet and an increase in the 
organization’s attractiveness to other local businesses.39 
Although for-profit corporations can and do engage in activities 
with nonprofit organizations, there has always been an inherent risk 
of blurring the nonprofit/for-profit distinction for both entities. 
Nonprofits risk the loss of tax-exemption and the receipt of unrelated 
business income. For-profit entities risk shareholder complaints and 
lawsuits for a failure to maximize profits. 
Henry Ford learned this lesson when he announced his 
intention to use the benefits derived from his successful business 
venture to help ensure the betterment of a broad spectrum of 
individuals rather than just his shareholders.40 In response to a legal 
challenge filed by shareholders of the Ford Corporation, a court 
ultimately ordered the Ford Corporation to declare a special 
dividend to the shareholders.41 At the turn of the century, the stage 
was not quite set for the stakeholder approach, but that soon began 
 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
37  Larry Weinstein & John Cook, The Benefits of Collaboration Between For-Profit 
Businesses and Nonprofit Arts-or-Culture-Oriented Organizations, SAM Advanced 
Management Journal 4 (2011). 
38  Philip Kotler, STANDING ROOM ONLY: STRATEGIES FOR MARKETING THE 
PERFORMING ARTS 178 (1997). 
39  Id. 
40  Matthew F. Doeringer, Fostering Social Enterprise: A Historical and International 
Analysis, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 304 (2010). 
41  Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 678 (Mich. 1919). 
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to change. In 1932, Harvard Law Professor E. Merrick Dodd 
proposed that corporations had a societal obligation that extended 
beyond the shareholders.42 A few years later, in 1950, the American 
Bar Association amended the Model Business Corporation Act to 
acknowledge that corporate contributions to charities were a 
permissible means of enhancing corporate well being and 
reputation.43 
At present, there is a genuine debate in the legal community as 
to whether shareholder wealth maximization principles advocated by 
the court in Dodge v. Ford remain a viable position.44 If those who 
believe that shareholder wealth maximization is no longer an 
absolute requirement for corporations are correct, then perhaps 
Benefit Corporations are not as necessary as advocates claim. 
While both the Business Judgment Rule and state constituency 
statutes support the position that corporations already have the 
ability to conduct activities with a social benefit purpose, these 
protections do not offer the same level of protection to directors as 
the Benefit Corporation. The Business Judgment Rule insulates 
directors from liability to shareholders for decisions made with care 
and in good faith. Under this rule, “a court will not second guess the 
decisions of a director as long as they are made (1) in good faith, (2) 
 
42  E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1145, 1148 (1932). 
43  R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Giving at the Office: A Reappraisal of 
Charitable Contributions by Corporations, 54 BUS. LAW. 965, 969 (1999). 
44  See, e.g.Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. 
REV. 163, 168, 174 (2008) (maintaining that “shareholder wealth maximization is not 
a modern legal principle” and that the Ford case is “bad law”); Judy F. Sneirson, 
Green is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 
IOWA L. REV. 987, 1003 (2009) (cases establishing a duty of shareholder wealth 
maximization are “few and far between and relatively obscure”); Jill E. Fisch, 
Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 
651 (2006) (“Although Dodge v. Ford is frequently cited, no modern court has struck 
down an operational decision on the grounds that it favors stakeholder interests over 
shareholder interests”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423-4 
(1993) (“the mainstream of corporate law remains committed to the principles 
espoused by the Dodge court”); and Kent Greenfield, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 41-42 (2006) (“there is no 
principle of corporate law that is more central to the way businesses are organized 
and regulated within the United States” than that of shareholder wealth 
maximization). 
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with the care that a reasonably prudent person would use, and (3) 
with the reasonable belief that they are acting in the best interests of 
the corporation.”45 This doctrine grants corporate directors 
significant leeway to make decisions that advance social objectives. 
However, this freedom is not unlimited, as the Business Judgment 
Rule will not protect any actions that are considered wasteful or 
irrational.46 
By 1983, states began to enact corporate constituency statutes to 
give directors some ability to consider interests other than those of 
the shareholders.47 Not all states have adopted constituency statutes, 
and some provide directors with more latitude than others.48 While 
many of the constituency statutes allow directors to consider the 
interests of employees, creditors and customers, most do not allow 
directors to consider broader environmental issues or human rights 
concerns.49 As will be described more fully in Part II, some states’ 
Benefit Corporation laws allow directors to consider the interests of a 
very broad array of stakeholders, thus providing an advantage over 
constituency statutes. 
B. The Social Entrepreneurs Shape the Hybrid Entity 
Social enterprise is the application of private business models to 
remedy social needs or ills.50 The actions of the social enterprise 
movement are not dictated by a pre-determined set of purposes or 
activities, but rather social entrepreneurs seek to remedy social needs 
that they have identified.51 There was increased recognition that the 
 
45  Business Judgment Rule, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE,  
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/business_judgment_rule (last visited Mar. 30, 
2014). 
46  Steve Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: Traditional Governance 
Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW.J.L. & SOC.POL’Y 170, 
179 (2012).  
47  15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 515-517 (1990). 
48  See, Jonathan Springer, Corporate Law Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow 
Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85 (1999) (for a more detailed 
discussion of constituency statutes).   
49  Id. 
50  Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? Applying Traditional 
Corporate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. 
BUS. L. 221, 230 (2012). 
51  Id. at 231. 
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government alone could not solve social problems.52 Unconstrained 
by bureaucracy, politics, and set budgets, and having access to private 
resources, social entrepreneurs possess distinct advantages over 
government agencies when it comes to exploring and solving social 
ills.53 These entrepreneurs “have an important role to play, whether it 
is to complement or supplant government efforts.”54 
The early encouragement of social entrepreneurs can be traced 
back to the efforts of three innovative, nonprofit organizations in the 
1980’s: Ashoka, New Ventures, and the Alpha Center for Public and 
Private Initiatives.55 Ashoka, a global organization founded by Bill 
Drayton in 1980, was created to promote social change by investing in 
social entrepreneurs and presently “engages communities of 
entrepreneurs and develops patterns of effective collaborations that 
change entire fields.”56 In that same year, New Ventures was founded 
by Ed Skloot as a consulting firm with the goal of helping nonprofit 
organizations to discover new sources of funding.57 This mission soon 
advanced to also helping the nonprofits develop business skills that 
could enhance their financial viability.58 A few years later, in 1985, the 
Alpha Center for Public and Private Initiatives was founded to 
encourage entrepreneurs to address social problems.59 Most 
significantly, the Alpha Center “brought into the conversation this 
idea of blurring the sector boundaries. And it raised the question of 
what can and should be done by nonprofits and what role for-profit 
or hybrid structures might play in achieving sustainable social 
impact.”60 
 
52  J. Gregory Dees, Taking Social Entrepreneurship Seriously, 44 SOCIETY 24, 25 
(2007). 
53  Id. at 26. 
54  Id. at 27. 
55  Katherine Fulton & Greg Dees, The Past, Present, and Future of Social 
Entrepreneurship, a Conversation with Greg Dees, DUKE UNIV. CENTER FOR ADVANCEMENT 
OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP (Feb. 15, 2006), 
http://www.caseatduke.org/documents/deesinterview.pdf [hereinafter Past, Present 
and Future]. 
56  Ashoka Approach, ASHOKA, https://www.ashoka.org/approach (last visited Mar.  
30, 2014). 
57  Fulton & Dees, supra note 55. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
60  Fulton & Dees, supra note 55. 
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“[T]hrough a process of exploration, innovation, 
experimentation, and resource mobilization,” these entrepreneurs 
unearthed and generated new opportunities.61 Increasingly, for-profit 
business owners began to consider ways in which their corporations 
might somehow serve the common good. Brands such as Ben & 
Jerry’s, Seventh Generation, and Newman’s Own, introduced the 
notion of the social responsibility of business to consumers.62 Ben & 
Jerry’s introduced the improvement of the environment as a “second 
bottom line” for business.63 For this reason, it is sometimes 
considered to be the first socially responsible business.64 The stated 
social mission of Ben & Jerry’s is to initiate innovative ways to improve 
the quality of life nationally and internationally.65 All the after-tax 
profits of Newman’s Own are donated to charities both in the United 
States and abroad.66 Since the formation of the company in 1982, the 
company has donated over $400 million.67 
Soon, a third “bottom line” was added to the socially responsible 
business agenda with a focus on people— not just employees and 
consumers, but the environment as well.68 Seventh Generation, for 
example, with its commitment to considering the effects of its actions 
on the next seven generations, designs products with sustainability in 
mind and has helped to create benchmarks for sustainable corporate 
behavior, which resulted in the company being named a 2011 Leader 
for Change by the United Nations and the Foundation for Social 
Change.69 This “triple bottom line” also referred to as “Corporate 
 
61  Dees, supra note 52. 
62  Alissa Mickels, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 271, 274 (2009). 
63  Frank J. Cavico & Bahaudin G. Mutjaba, National and Global Perspectives of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, INT’L J. MGMT. SCI. & BUS. RES. 1, 7 (2012), available at 
http://ijmsbr.com/National-5.pdf; see also Jeffrey Hollender & Stephen Fenichell, 
WHAT MATTERS MOST: HOW A SMALL GROUP OF PIONEERS IS TEACHING SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY TO BIG BUSINESS, AND WHY BIG BUSINESS IS LISTENING 167-69 (2004).  
64  Cavico & Mutjaba, supra note 63 at 7.  
65  BEN AND JERRY’S, “Our Values,” http://www.benjerry.com/values (last visited 
May 13, 2014). 
66  NEWMAN’S OWN, “Charities,” http://www.newmansown.com/charity/ (last 
visited May 13, 2014).  
67  Id. 
68  Mickels, supra note 62. 
69  Press Release, Reuters: Seventh Generation Named 2011 United Nations 
Leader of Change (October 19, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/19/idUS231603+19-Oct-
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Social Responsibility,” “Creative Capitalism,” and “Venture 
Philanthropy” soon gained traction. 
The start of the twenty-first century has brought a marked 
increase in interest in and development of social entrepreneurship.70 
Data available from Bloomberg shows that by 2007 “about 11 
[percent] of all assets under professional management (more than 
2.7 trillion) were invested in a socially responsible investment and 
more than 30,000 U.S. companies were members of socially 
responsible business organizations.”71 In 2009, the White House 
Office of Social Innovation was created to increase investment in 
social enterprises.72 In fact, the notion of corporate social 
responsibility had become so accepted by the start of the twenty-first 
century, that, in 2011, for the first time in its 94-year history, Forbes 
magazine released a ranking list based on social innovation.73 The 
Forbes Impact 30 ranking recognizes the top 30 social innovators 
judged on impact, social accountability, and social 
entrepreneurship.74 With growing widespread recognition of social 
entrepreneurship, it is not surprising that the next step along the 
journey was the creation of an entity that could still maintain a 
certain level of profit, yet also have a nonprofit purpose.  This was the 
L3C, the low profit, limited liability company. 
1. The L3C is Created to Secure Program Related 
Investments 
One of the earliest steps to creating a type of hybrid entity that 
could derive profit and also carry out a nonprofit purpose can be 
traced back to the work of the Aspen Institute. The Aspen Institute, 
established in 1950, is a widely recognized, international nonprofit 
organization working “to foster leadership based on enduring values 
 
2011+MW20111019. 
70  John Tozzi, New Legal Protections for Social Entrepreneurs, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS 
WEEK, Apr. 22, 2010, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/apr2010/sb20100421_414362.htm. 
71  Id. 
72  Steven Haymore, Public(ly Oriented) Companies: B Corporations and the Delaware 
Stockholder Provision Dilemma, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1311 (2011). 
73  Helen Coster, Forbes List of the Top Thirty Social Entrepreneurs, FORBES (Nov. 30, 
2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/helencoster/2011/11/30/forbes-list-of-the-top-
30-social-entrepreneurs/. 
74  Id. 
ARTICLE_ALEXANDER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/9/2014  1:57 PM 
234 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 38:2 
 
and to provide a nonpartisan venue for dealing with critical issues.”75 
As part of its mission, the Institute hosts regular seminars and policy 
programs bringing together some of the leading figures in the social 
enterprise movement for discussion and problem-solving.76 At one 
such meeting in September of 2006 entitled, “Exploring New Legal 
Forms and Tax Structures for Social Enterprise Organizations,” one 
of the participants, Robert Lang, proposed a plan for a low-profit, 
limited liability company (“L3C”) that would advance a social mission 
and at the same time provide a vehicle to receive investments from 
private investors, the government, and nonprofit foundations.77 This 
last item, securing funding from private foundations, referred to as 
Program Related Investments or PRIs, was one of Lang’s primary 
motivators in creating the L3C.78 
The law governing private foundations requires foundations to 
spend a certain percentage of their funds each year on charitable 
purposes.79 Failure to distribute 5 percent of income (whether 
through grants, donations, or PRIs) results in the imposition of an 
excise tax.80 Excise taxes are also imposed when a private foundation 
makes investments that may jeopardize the fulfillment of their 
exempt purpose.81 According to Treasury Regulations, 
an investment shall be considered to jeopardize the 
carrying out ofthe exempt purposes of a private foundation 
if it is determined that the foundation managers, in making 
such investment, have failed to exercise ordinary business 
 
75  Harvard University Institute of Politics, Aspen Institute, 
http://www.iop.harvard.edu/aspen-institute; The Aspen Institute Mission Statement, 
ASPEN INSTITUTE, http://www.aspeninstitute.org/about (last visited August 17, 2013). 
76  The Aspen Institute Mission Statement, ASPEN INSTITUTE, 
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/about (last visited August 17, 2013). 
77  Thomas J. Billitteri, Mixing Mission and Business: Does Social Enterprise Need a New 
Legal Approach, Highlights from an Aspen Institute Roundtable, ASPEN INST. (Jan. 2007), 
http://tidescanada.org/wp-
content/uploads/files/causeway/Mixing_Mission_and_Business.pdf. 
78  Id. 
79  I.R.C. § 4942 (2014). 
80  Matthew Doeringer, Fostering Social Enterprise: A Historical and International 
Analysis, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291 (2010). Section 4942 of the Internal 
Revenue Code imposes an excise tax of 30% of the amount of income that is 
undistributed at the beginning of the subsequent tax year. This amount will increase 
to 100% if distribution requirements are not met in a specified period. 
81  I.R.C. § 4944 (2014). 
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care and prudence, under the facts and circumstances 
prevailing at the time of making the investment, in 
providing for the long- and short-term financial needs of 
the foundation to carry out its exempt purposes. In the 
exercise of the requisite standard of care and prudence the 
foundation managers may take into account the expected 
return (including both income and appreciation of capital), 
the risks of rising and falling price levels, and the need for 
diversification within the investment portfolio (for example, 
with respect to type of security, type of industry, maturity of 
company, degree of risk[,] and potential for return).82 
There is an exception to the imposition of excise taxes on 
jeopardizing investments if the investment is a PRI.83 To be 
considered a PRI: (1) the primary purpose of the investment must be 
to accomplish a charitable or educational purpose as described in 
Internal Revenue Code section 170(c)(2)(B); (2) the production of 
income or capital appreciation of property cannot be a significant 
portion of the investment; and (3) the investment cannot be used for 
political or legislative purposes described in Internal Revenue Code 
section 170(c)(2)(D).84 Under these rules, a private foundation’s 
investments in the form of loans, grants, and equity purchases in 
socially-motivated for-profit entities could qualify as a PRI.85 Richard 
Lang structured the L3C so that it would be able to meet the PRI 
requirements, thereby encouraging investment by the nonprofit 
sector in the for-profit LLC.86 
a. The Number of States Recognizing L3Cs Continues to 
Grow 
Working with Richard Lang, Americans for Community 
Development (“ACD”) has been responsible for promoting the state 
adoption of the L3C form of business.87 Lang and the ACD achieved a 
 
82  Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2)(i) (2014). 
83  I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2014).  
84  Id. 
85  Deborah Andrews, The “L3C”: The New Double-Hybrid Entity, PHILANTHROPY J., 
(Dec. 10, 2010), 
http://www.philanthropyjournal.org/resources/managementleadership/%E2%80%
98l3c%E2%80%99-new-double-hybrid-entity. 
86  Billitteri, supra note 77 at 13-14. 
87  Americans for Community Development, 
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measure of success when Vermont became the first state to recognize 
the L3C as a legal entity in April, 2008.88 Since that time, 215 active 
L3Cs have organized in Vermont.89 In addition to Vermont, eight 
other states have adopted the L3C: Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, 
Michigan, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Utah, and Wyoming.90 
L3C legislation is currently pending in several other states.91 Two 
federal jurisdictions— the Oglala Sioux Tribe and the Crow Indian 
Nation of Montana— have also adopted L3C legislation.92 This 
legislation allows “a limited liability company . . . to become a low-
profit limited liability company . . . when organized for a business 
purpose and operated to significantly further charitable purposes but 
without a significant purpose to produce income or asset 
appreciation.”93 
b. The Flexible Nature of the L3C makes it an Appealing 
Investment Vehicle 
The statutory requirements of the Vermont L3C are substantially 
the same as those adopted in the other states. The L3C may be 
organized for any purpose, but must be operated to satisfy the 
 
http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).   
88  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 3001(27) (2012). 
89  Here’s the Latest L3C Tally, INTERSECTOR PARTNERS L3C (Mar. 3, 2014), 
http://www.intersectorl3c.com/l3c_tally.html (The tally of active L3Cs in the other 
states are: 147 in Illinois, 170 in Louisiana, 339 in Maine, 218 in Michigan, 105* in 
North Carolina, 7 in Rhode Island, 57 in Utah, and 41 in Wyoming. *L3C law 
repealed as of January 1, 2014). 
90  805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26 (2012); L.A. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1305 (2012); 
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 31, § 1611 (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.4102 (2012); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 57C-2-01(d) (2012) (repealed 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-2 (2012); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 48-2c-102(4)(b) (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-102(ix) (2012). 
91  See S.B. 323, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011); S.B. 528, Gen. Assemb. (Conn. 2013); H.B. 
2361, Reg. Sess.  (KS. 2013); H.B. 167, 188th Gen. Ct.  (Mass. 2013); H.B. 606, Reg. 
Sess. (Mo. 2013); A.B. 6005, Gen. Assemb., (N.Y. 2013); S.B. 1825, Gen. Assemb. 
(N.Y. 2013); S.B. 5097, Gen. Assemb. (N.Y. 2013); S.B. 506, 108th Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 
2013); H.B. 2622, 83rd Leg. (Tex. 2013); A.B. 870 (Wis. 2013); Carter G. Bishop, Fifty 
State Series: L3C and B Corporation Legislation Table (SUFFOLK UNIV. LAW SCH., LEGAL 
STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, RESEARCH PAPER 10-11, April 1, 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1561783. 
92 Laws, AM. FOR CMTY. DEV.: THE ORG. FOR THE L3C, 
http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/legislation.html (last visited 
Dec. 5, 2013). 
93  Carter G. Bishop, The Low-Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related Investment by Proxy 
or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243, 243 (2010). 
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following: 
(A) The Company significantly furthers the 
accomplishment of one or more charitable or educational 
purposes within the meaning of Section 170(c)(2)(B) of 
the IRS Code of 1986 . . . and (ii) would not have been 
formed but for the company’s relationship to the 
accomplishment of charitable94 or educational purposes. 
(B) No significant purpose of the company is the 
production of income or the appreciation of property; 
provided, however, that the fact that a person produces 
significant income or capital appreciation shall not, in the 
absence of other factors, be conclusive evidence of a 
significant purpose involving the production of income or 
the appreciation of property. 
(C) No purpose of the company is to accomplish one or 
more political or legislative purposes within the meaning of 
Section 170(c)(2)(D) of the IRS code of 1986 . . . [and] 
(D) If a company that met the definition of this 
subdivision . . . at its formation at any time ceases to satisfy 
any one of the requirements, it shall immediately cease to 
be a low-profit LLC, but by continuing to meet all the other 
requirements of this chapter, will continue to exist as a 
limited liability company.95 
This language mirrors that of the PRI requirements. While the 
L3C can earn a profit, this can only be incidental and not a 
significant purpose of the entity. The L3C statutory language was 
drafted with the intention of having the L3C qualify as a PRI for 
private foundations to help facilitate this funding.96 All states require 
that some variation of L3C or low-profit LLC be included in the entity 
name.97 As a general rule, state laws also include ramifications in the 
 
94  Charitable and education purposes include “religious, charitable, scientific, 
literary, or educational purposes . . . foster[ing] national or international amateur 
sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic 
facilities or equipment), . . . [and] prevent[ing] . . . cruelty to children or animals.” 
I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) (2012). 
95  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (2013). 
96  For an excellent discussion of the L3C as a qualified Program Related 
Investment, see generally Bishop, supra note 93. 
97  CHRISTOPHER REINHART, NO. 2011-R-0344, OLR RESEARCH REPORT: LOW-PROFIT 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES OR L3CS (2011), 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2011/rpt/2011-R-0344.htm. 
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event the entity no longer qualifies as an L3C. 
The L3C provides all the benefits of an LLC, such as a flexible 
ownership structure, profit distributions, and flow-through taxation.98 
The L3C provides “both that credibility and liability protection for 
the owners and management, while leaving enforcement to the state 
and not subjecting the business to periodic audits by a third party. 
Plus, great branding and marketing opportunities.”99 Some areas 
where L3Cs have been utilized include: carbon trading, alternative 
energy, food bank processing, social services, arts funding, job 
creation programs, and housing for low income and aging 
populations.100 In Maine, this hybrid form of business seemingly saved 
a group of Maine dairy farmers. When Maine dairy farmer David 
Vaughn lost his contract with his organic milk processor, H.P. Hood, 
he and nine other small farmers also let go by Hood, joined together 
to create an L3C, MOOMilk, to process and sell their milk on their 
own.101 By doing business in this form, they hope to gain funding 
from both social funds and foundations.102 According to attorney Paul 
Dillon, who structured the business, the L3C made sense for the 
farmers.103 He stated, “[i]nstead of building equity for the middle guy, 
we’re using the low-profit model to keep profits going to the 
farmers . . . . Nobody’s going to get rich investing in this L3C. But, if 
the goal is to save family farms, that is going to happen.”104 
Given the short life of this entity, the legal and tax consequences 
of this form of doing business remain to be seen. At present, no 
special tax incentives exist for this form of business.105 This is not 
 
98  See Billitteri, supra note 77, at 6-7, 13. 
99  Jessica Manganello, The Low Profit Limited Liability Company (L3C): A New Model 
for Cleantech?, GREEN LIGHT DISTRIKT (Sept. 13, 2010), 
http://thegreenlightdistrikt.com/2010/09/13/the-low-profit-limited-liability-
company-l3c-a-new-model-for-cleantech. 
100  Jim Witkin, The L3C: A More Creative Capitalism, TRIPLEPUNDIT (Jan. 15, 2009), 
www.triplepundit.com/2009/01/the-l3c-a-more-creative-capitalism. 
101  Malika Zouhali-Worrall, For L3C Companies, Profit Isn’t the Point, CNNMONEY 
(Feb. 9, 2010 10:49 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/08/smallbusiness/l3c_low_profit_companies/#. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. 
104  Id. 
105  Evangeline Gomez, The Rise of the Charitable For-Profit Entity, FORBES (Jan. 31, 
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/evangelinegomez/2012/01/13/the-rise-of-the-
charitable-for-profit-entity/. 
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surprising, since most L3Cs, as other LLCs, are not taxed at the entity 
level unless they opt for such tax treatment.106 If the entity has a single 
owner, it will automatically be treated as a flow-through. However, if 
there are multiple owners or members the entity can elect to be taxed 
as a corporation, but if such election is not made, the entity will not 
itself be subject to tax.107 
To date, the level of PRI funding anticipated by the founders of 
the L3C movement has not been realized.108 The most significant 
reasons for this are likely that (1) foundations tend to refrain from 
making PRIs due to the costs of ensuring compliance with the private 
foundation rules governing PRIs and (2) the L3C is a new form of 
business with an unproven track record.109 Concern has been 
expressed that the language of the L3C legislation incorrectly implies 
that the structure of the entity will simplify access to PRIs, which is 
not the case.110 
Foundations would want certainty that the L3C qualifies as a PRI 
in order to avoid making a “jeopardizing investment.” However, “[i]t 
is cumbersome and costly to determine what qualifies as a PRI, since 
foundations have yet to use PRIs on a large scale.”111 Absent an official 
IRS announcement that investment in an L3C can qualify as a PRI, 
foundations are likely to hesitate to invest in this manner.112 To 
address such concerns, Congressmen Jared Polis (D-Colorado) and 
 
106  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1) (2014) (An LLC with a single member 
(owner) is considered a disregarded entity for tax purposes; an LLC with multiple 
members is automatically taxed as a partnership unless taxation as a corporation is 
elected). 
107  Treas. Reg § 301.7701-3 (2014) (“Check-the-box regulations”). 
108  Elizabeth Schmidt, Vermont’s Social Hybrid Pioneers: Early Observations and 
Questions to Ponder, 35 VT. L. REV. 163, 189-90 (2010). 
109  Id. at 190-91. 
110  Daniel Kleinberger, ABA Business Law Section, on Behalf of its Committees on LLCs 
and Nonprofit Organizations, Opposes Legislation for Low Profit Limited Liability Companies 
(L3Cs) (William Mitchell Coll. of Law, Working Paper No. 2012-05, 2012). (There are 
no shortcuts with regard to compliance for PRIs.  Private foundations would risk 
their tax exempt status if they did not ensure that the PRI furthered the foundation’s 
mission and that foundation funds were not improperly being used for a private 
benefit.  Since for-profit investors will likely expect a market rate of return, and the 
nonprofit investors will receive a lower rate of return, there is concern whether 
nonprofit funding would be put to a private use). 
111  Heather Sertial, Hybrid Entities: Distributing Profits with a Purpose, 17 FORDHAM 
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 261, 283 (2012). 
112  Id. 
ARTICLE_ALEXANDER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/9/2014  1:57 PM 
240 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 38:2 
 
Aaron Schock (R-Illinois) introduced H.R. 3420, the Philanthropic 
Facilitation Act of 2011, to Congress in November of 2011 to “simplify 
the ability of foundations to invest in businesses with common 
missions.”113 This bill is not designed to change the criteria as to what 
qualifies as a PRI but rather to simplify the process by which a 
business can receive approval from the IRS that it qualifies as a PRI, a 
factor that might make the L3C investments more attractive to private 
foundations. This legislation did not pass, but similar legislation, H.R. 
2832, was reintroduced in July 2013 by Congressman Cory Gardner 
(R-Colorado) and co-sponsored by Congressman Polis.114 
In April 2012, proposed Treasury Regulations were released to 
supplement the existing forty-year-old regulations defining PRIs.115 
These regulations have been proposed because “[t]he Treasury 
Department and the IRS are aware that the private foundation 
community would find it helpful if the regulations could include 
additional PRI examples that reflect current investment practices.”116 
The new examples make it clear that PRIs can include equity 
investments and loans to for-profit organizations that serve as a 
vehicle for accomplishing an exempt purpose. For instance, 
proposed example 11 describes a private foundation’s purchase of 
stock of a for-profit subsidiary of a for-profit drug company.117 The 
subsidiary was formed to research and develop a vaccine to prevent a 
disease that predominantly affects poor people living in developing 
countries.118 The subsidiary will also distribute the vaccine at an 
affordable price. According to the proposed regulations, this 
investment qualifies as an investment in a PRI because the purpose of 
advancement of science furthers the foundation’s exempt activities.119 
This example is similar to the $10 million investment of the Bill 
& Melinda Gates Foundation in Liquidia, a biotechnology company 
 
113  Karl Dakin, Congressman Polis Introduces Philanthropic Facilitation Act of 2011, 
SULLIVAN CHAIR (Nov. 22, 2011), http://sullivanchair.com/congressman-polis-
introduces-philanthropic-facilitation-act-of-2011/. 
114  Philanthropic Facilitation Act, H.R. 2832, 113th Cong. (2013), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c113:H.R.2832.IH:. 
115  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3, 77 Fed. Reg. 23429 (Apr. 19, 2012). 
116  E.g., Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3, 77 Fed. Reg. 23429, 23429 (Apr. 19, 2012). 
117  Id. at 23, 430. 
118  Id. 
119  Id. 
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involved with vaccine development.120 It is recognized that “interest is 
growing rapidly in using PRIs to buy stakes in businesses that can 
help foundations achieve their missions . . . and the Gates 
Foundation alone will change the dynamics.”121 The proposed 
regulations do not provide any specific guidance on the investment 
in an L3C, but the fact that they clarify that investment in a for-profit 
entity is permissible, and that a broad array of activities can be 
supported (such as advancing science, promoting the arts, and 
addressing environmental concerns) may make private foundations 
more willing to invest in this relatively new form of business.122 
Updates to the proposed regulations are expected, as indicated by 
the following comments issued by the White House, encouraging 
feedback, “[w]e hope that the proposed rule will spark a dialogue 
over the next few months with the philanthropic community. 
Through feedback on the guidelines and an exchange of ideas, we 
hope to update the regulations in a manner that serves the public 
interest.”123 
While the L3C is admittedly a flexible hybrid form that may 
expand the funding of for-profit social enterprise, some argue that 
the L3C is an unnecessary form of business in that it adds nothing 
new to existing law.124 For example, in Delaware, as in many other 
states, an LLC can be organized for any purpose and can choose to 
both provide societal benefits and produce profits; no special 
designation is required since the “freedom to contract” permits 
operating agreements to be drafted as the parties see fit.125 Further 
supporting this view is a private letter ruling in which the Internal 
 
120  Stephanie Strom, To Advance Their Cause, Foundations Buy Stocks, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 25, 2011, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/25/business/foundations-come-to-the-aid-of-
companies.html?pagewanted=all. 
121  Id. 
122  E.g., Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3, 77 Fed. Reg. 23429, 23429, 23430 (Apr. 19, 
2012). 
123  Jonathan Greenblatt, Opening the Door for Program Related Investments, WHITE 
HOUSE OFF. SOC. INNOVATION & CIVIC PARTICIPATION (May 4, 2012), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/05/04/opening-door-program-related-
investments. 
124  For an in-depth critique of the L3C, see Ann E. Conaway, The Global Use of the 
Delaware Limited Liability Company for Socially-Driven Purposes, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
772 (2012). 
125  Id. at 784.  
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Revenue Service approved a foundation’s investment in a for-profit 
LLC as a PRI because the operating agreement of the entity matched 
the foundation’s mission objectives.126 Such a ruling reinforces the 
position taken by the Business Law section of the American Bar 
Association which came out in opposition to the passage of L3C 
legislation when such legislation was proposed in Minnesota.127 
The ABA committee views the L3C as an unnecessary form of 
business since under Minnesota’s existing LLC statute, “it is already 
possible to create a low-profit limited liability company.”128 The 
Minnesota LLC statute, much like the LLC statutes of majority of 
states, allows the members of the LLC to determine the LLC’s 
purpose and allocation of rights.129 The ABA committee is not alone 
in its concerns. In fact, the existence of the L3C in North Carolina 
has been such a source of controversy that effective January 1, 2014, 
the low-profit LLC will be dropped from the state’s LLC statute.130 
The next logical step for the social enterprise movement was the 
creation of a hybrid corporate form of doing business: enter the 
Benefit Corporation. 
III. BENEFIT CORPORATIONS ARE HERALDED AS THE IDEAL 
CORPORATE FORM FOR SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE 
ENTREPRENEURS 
According to a White Paper on the need and rationale for the 
Benefit Corporation, “[f]or-profit entrepreneurship, social investing, 
and the sustainable business movement have reached critical mass. . . 
. [A]ccelerating consumer and investor demand has resulted in the 
formation of a substantial marketplace for companies that put 
purpose, not profit, at the center of the business.”131 Responding to 
 
126  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-10-020, at 1-3, 18 (Mar. 10, 2006). 
127  Kleinberger, supra note 110. 
128  Id. 
129  Id. 
130  Doug Batey, North Carolina Becomes the First State to Drop L3C’s, LLC LAW 
MONITOR (July 9, 2013 12:02 PM) 
http://www.llclawmonitor.com/2013/07/articles/lowprofit-llcs/north-carolina-
becomes-the-first-state-to-drop-l3cs/. 
131  William H. Clark & Larry Vranka, The Need and Rationale for the Benefit 
Corporation: Why It Is the Legal Form that Best Addresses the Needs of Social Entrepreneurs, 
Investors, and, Ultimately, the Public, BENEFIT CORP., Apr. 2012, 
http://benefitcorp.net/storage/The_Need_and_Rationale_for_Benefit_Corporation
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the call for an increased emphasis on stakeholders in corporate 
decision making, in April, 2010, Maryland became the first state to 
enact Benefit Corporation legislation.132 Since then, several other 
states have followed suit.133 Benefit Corporations are formed to have a 
“material, positive impact on society and the environment.”134 
Language in the corporate charter requires directors to consider the 
interests of a broad variety of stakeholders, including, but not limited 
to, the community, employees, and consumers.135 Benefit Corporation 
shareholders “now have additional rights to hold directors 
accountable for failure to create a material positive impact on society 
or to consider the impact of decisions on employees, community, and 
the [local and global] environment.”136 In addition to having a 
general positive impact on society, the Benefit Corporation may also 
choose to provide specific public benefits such as preserving the 
environment, improving human health, promoting the arts, sciences, 
and advancement of knowledge.137 Whether or not the Benefit 
Corporation meets its obligations and has a positive impact on society 
may be determined with reference to an independent, third party 
standard.138 Most Benefit Corporations are required to report 
annually on their social and environmental performance using this 
standard. 
Several prominent social-minded businesses have welcomed the 
new form of business and modified their corporate charters to adopt 
this form. For example, shortly after Vermont enacted Benefit 
Corporation legislation in July 2011, King Arthur Flour Corporation 
became one of the first businesses in the state to become a Benefit 
 
s_-_April_2012.pdf. 
132  Michael Deskins, Benefit Corporation Legislation: Version 1.0 — A Breakthrough in 
Stakeholder Rights?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV 1047 (2011).  
133  See supra note 8.  
134  Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations: A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 
46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 597 (2011) (quoting S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. §§ 2, 
5 (Haw. 2011)). 
135  MD CODE ANN. CORPS & ASS’NS, § 5-6C-07 (West 2012). Existing corporations 
can convert to Benefit Corporation status as long as two-thirds of the shareholders 
approve the necessary amendments to the corporate charter.  MD CODE ANN. CORPS 
& ASS’NS, § 5-6C-03(b) (West 2012); see also MD CODE ANN. CORPS & ASS’NS, § 2-
604(e) (West 2012). 
136  Press Release, supra note 6. 
137  Reiser, supra note 134 at 597-98. 
138  Munch, supra note 46 at 186. 
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Corporation. Becoming a Benefit Corporation was a logical step for 
this 200-plus year old employee-owned corporation that prides itself 
on its commitment to the community, to its employees, and to the 
environment.139 In recognition of these efforts, it has received 
accolades such as a Social Legacy Award “for handing down to 
employee owners a centuries-old tradition of purity, for both the 
consumer and the environment.”140 According to a King Arthur Flour 
spokesperson, “even in becoming . . . a Vermont Benefit Corporation, 
it wasn’t a significant change for employees, because we were already 
operating in this socially responsible way. It just codified that 
commitment.”141 
Having a third party conduct an annual evaluation has been 
touted as an important component of Benefit Corporation status. 
Responding to increased consumer demand for socially responsible 
products, product marketing terms such as “green” and “sustainable” 
are now so widely used that they have begun to lose their meaning.142 
To combat this problem, known as “greenwashing,” a variety of 
organizations, among them Greenseal, Underwriters Laboratories, 
Global Reporting Initiative, Green American, and B-Lab, provide 
performance evaluations and certifications such as “Organic,” “Free 
Trade,” “Energy Star,” and “Greenseal.”143 One of the challenges this 
presents is how this standard will be set and applied. The model 
legislation does not specify what form the standards will take, nor 
does it dictate how compliance will be monitored; all that is required 
is independence and transparency in the process.144 As will be 
discussed later in this paper, the requirement of third party 
assessment has not, in fact, been included in all state Benefit 
Corporation statutes. 
 
139  Id. at 172. 
140  Peter Asmus, 16th Annual Business Ethics Awards, BUSINESS ETHICS, Fall 2004, at 
8, 15, available at 
http://secure.pdcnet.org/852575A9004F1216/file/B95146B60F5C3DBC852576850
063DFD5/$FILE/bemag_2004_0018_0003_0006_0015.pdf. 
141  Jeff Gangemi, King Arthur Flour: A Sustainability-Minded Corporation Expands Its 
Footprint (May 2, 2012), http://www.farmplate.com/category/blog-tags/local-food. 
142  William H. Clark & Elizabeth Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are Redefining 
the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 820–21 (2012). 
143  Id. at 821; Briana Cummings, Note, Benefit Corporations: How to Enforce a 
Mandate to Promote the Public Interest, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 578, 594 (2012). 
144  Reiser, supra note 134. 
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A. The Benefit Corporation Model Charter is Created by B-Lab 
One entity available to provide an independent, third party 
review of Benefit Corporations is B-Lab, a Pennsylvania nonprofit 
with a direct connection to the Benefit Corporation movement.145 B-
Lab was formed in 2006 by three friends, Andrew Kassoy, Jay Coen 
Gilbert, and Bart Houlahan, who recognized at that time that, “there 
is a huge marketplace of companies and their consumers and 
investors . . . are interested in creating value for all stakeholders, not 
just shareholders.”146 B-Lab proposed the idea of a Certified B 
Corporation that would be certified by B-Lab.147 A Certified B 
Corporation is a corporation that creates a general public benefit as 
measured by an independent third-party standard.148 
Unlike the Benefit Corporation, the Certified B Corporation 
does not represent a new corporate structure; rather, it is a for-profit 
entity given a social enterprise seal of approval by the B-Lab.149 A 
Certified B Corporation must meet a minimum set of social and 
environmental performance standards and also submit to periodic 
audits.150 To become certified as B Corporation an entity must (1) 
earn a minimum score of 80 on the B Impact Assessment,151 (2) adopt 
the B Corporation Legal Framework, and (3) sign a Term Sheet and 
Declaration of Interdependence to make the certification official.152 
 
145  The B Corporation: A Business Model for the New Economy, CAP. INST., 
http://capitalinstitute.org/metrics/b-corporation-business-model-new-economy (last 
visited March 28, 2014). 
146  Id. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. 
149  Id. 
150  Id. 
151  This is a benchmark tool for social and environmental impact. See B LAB, 
Performance Requirements, http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-
become-a-b-corp/performance-requirements (last visited May 8, 2014). According to 
the company’s website, “B-Lab’s Standard Advisory Council, an independent 
committee, is responsible for the content and weighting of the standards expressed 
in the B Impact Assessment.  Each member of the SAC is respected for their wisdom 
and their deep industry or stakeholder expertise.” See also B IMPACT ASSESSMENT, 
Standards Advisory Council, http://bimpactassessment.net/our-team (last visited May 
8. 2014). 
152  B LAB, Term Sheet for Certified B Corporations (2013), 
http://www.bcorporation.net/sites/default/files/documents/term_sheets/2013_No
n_constituency_non_benefit.pdf (last visited May 15, 2014). This legal framework 
clarifies the pursuit of the dual mission of social benefit for stakeholder and profit. 
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Once certified, 20 percent of B Corporations are randomly selected 
for an on-site review during every two-year term.153 
To date, there are over 600 Certified B Corporations generating 
revenue of $3.11 billion annually and doing business in over 60 
industries.154 One of the stated goals of B-Lab has been to effect a 
broader change in the marketplace and move toward a system in 
which entities like the Certified B Corporation would be accorded a 
legal form of their own.155 To that end, B-Lab has been actively 
engaged in encouraging the adoption of Benefit Corporation 
legislation in the states.156 The following summary of the Model 
Benefit Corporation Legislation proposed by B-Lab is instructive in 
that it contains many of the provisions adopted in each of the states 
that have enacted Benefit Corporation legislation, although states are 
free to adopt their own variations of this model.  There is no “one 
size fits all” Benefit Corporation. 
  
 
Key provisions of the Term Sheet are: certification is for a two year period, B 
Corporations must submit an Impact Assessment; corporations must agree to an on 
site review, and corporations must comply with use of B Lab intellectual property. B 
LAB, Term Sheet for Certified B Corporations (2013), available at, 
http://www.bcorporation.net/sites/default/files/documents/term_sheets/2013_No
n_constituency_non_benefit.pdf (last visited May 15, 2014). The Declaration of 
Interdependence recognizes the ability of private enterprise to produce a public 
benefit. B LAB, Term Sheet for Certified B Corporations (2013), available at, 
http://www.bcorporation.net/sites/default/files/documents/term_sheets/2013_No
n_constituency_non_benefit.pdf (last visited May 15, 2014). 
153  B LAB, Term Sheet for Certified B Corporations (2013), 
http://www.bcorporation.net/sites/default/files/documents/term_sheets/2013_No
n_constituency_non_benefit.pdf (last visited May 15, 2014). 
154  B CORPORATION, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT (2012) at 3, 8. 
155  BENEFIT CORP INFORMATION CENTER, http://benefitcorp.net/about-b-lab (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2014). 
156  Id. 
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Table 2: Highlights of Model Legislation157 
Corporate Purposes
Create a general public benefit
Right to name a specific benefit for purpose 
Creation of public benefit in best interest of the 
corporation 
Accountability
Director’s duty— make decisions in best interest of the 
corporation 
Director’s duty— consider effects on stakeholders 
Independent Benefit Director to attest board acted in 
accordance with duties 
Transparency
Annual benefit report published in accordance with third 
party standards 
Annual Report delivered to shareholders, website, 
Secretary of State 
Right of Action
Only shareholders and directors have a right of action 
Right of action for violation of duty (purpose or standard 
of conduct) 
 
B. An Increasing Number of States are Adopting the Benefit 
Corporation 
Twenty-six states and the District of Columbia have already 
enacted Benefit Corporation legislation and legislation is pending in 
several others.158 This section reviews the Benefit Corporation for 
three states: Maryland, Vermont, and California. 
1. Maryland Becomes the First State to Adopt the Benefit 
Corporation 
Speaking on the day that Benefit Corporations were signed into 
 
157  Model Benefit Corporation Legislation with Explanatory Comments, B LAB 
10-12, 15, 20-22, 24, 
http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Model_Benefit_Corporation_Legislatio
n.doc (last visited May 29, 2014). 
158  See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. 
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law by Governor Martin O’Malley, the bill’s co-sponsor, State Senator 
Jamie Raskin stated, “[t]his is a great moment in the evolution of 
commercial life in Maryland and America.”159 Speaking on the same 
day, B-Lab co-founder, Jay Coen Gilbert remarked: 
Today marks an inflection point in the evolution of 
capitalism. With public trust in business at an all-time low, 
this represents the first systemic response to the underlying 
problems that created the financial crisis— protecting 
companies from the pressures of short-termism while 
creating benefit for shareholders and society over the long-
haul.160 
As initially drafted, the Benefit Corporation legislation did not 
encompass Limited Liability Companies.161 However, this was soon 
rectified when Maryland modified its statute and became the first 
state to enact the Benefit LLC.162 In another update to Benefit 
Corporation rules, in May 2011, Maryland became the first state to 
add the requirement that the term “Benefit” be included in the 
corporate name.163 
When making business decisions, directors of a Maryland 
Benefit Corporation must consider: (1) the stockholders, (2) 
employees of the Benefit Corporation as well as subsidiaries and 
suppliers of the benefit Corporation; (3) customers, (4) community 
and societal concerns, and (5) the local and global environment.164
 The directors do not owe a duty to the beneficiaries of the 
corporation’s purposes and, therefore, these beneficiaries lack 
standing to bring a claim against the directors.165 While Maryland 
 
159  B Lab, Maryland First State in the Union to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation, 
CSRWIRE, Apr. 14, 2010, http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/29332-Maryland-
First-State-in-Union-to-Pass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation.  
160  Id.  
161  Clean Currents First Benefit LLC in State of Maryland and Country, CLEAN 
CURRENTS (June 1, 2011), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20110717172616/http://www.cleancurrents.com/inde
x.php/newsroom/86-clean-currents-first-benefit-llc-in-state-of-maryland (The original 
webpage was not available. As such, this source was located on a web archive). 
162  Id. 
163  Reiser, supra note 134, at 594. 
164  MD. CODE ANN. CORPS & ASS’NS, § 5-6C-07 (West 2012). 
165  Penny J. Minna & Namha B. Corbin, Benefit Corporation Law Could Spur Socially 
Responsible Business Boom, DAILY RECORD 3 [MARYLAND], July 29, 2010, 
http://thedailyrecord.com/2010/07/29/benefit-corporation-law-could-spur-socially-
ARTICLE_ALEXANDER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/9/2014  1:57 PM 
2014] BENEFIT CORPORATIONS 249 
 
Benefit Corporations are required to disclose their stakeholder 
impact as per a third party standard, Maryland does not require a 
minimum level of impact nor does it require that all of the 
performance requirements that apply to B Corporations be met.166 
While the legislation does not provide details on what an acceptable 
third party standard is, it does require that the standard be 
transparent.167 
In the first three months after the new legislation was passed, 
fifteen benefit corporations were formed in Maryland.168 The 
Maryland State Department of Assessments and Taxation does not 
keep a record of the number of Benefit Corporations in the state. 
However, a recent survey indicated that there are 16 Benefit 
Corporations and 23 Benefit LLCs in Maryland.169 
There are no tax breaks or procurement incentives for 
benefit corporations in Maryland, but the classification 
offers a competitive advantage. ‘If you are feeding back into 
your customers goodwill, social justice, making sure your 
employees have sustainable wages, people understand that 
and in turn will support you for it,’ said Pennye Jones-
Napier, a Maryland Benefit Corporation business owner.170 
2. Vermont Follows Suit 
Soon thereafter, Vermont followed Maryland’s lead and adopted 
Benefit Corporation legislation that became effective on July 1, 
2011.171 As in Maryland, new corporations can be formed as Benefit 
 
responsible-business-boom/. 
166  Maryland Creates New Category of Organizations: Mission-Based, For-Profit Benefit 
Corporations (Apr. 26, 2010), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20111230160928/http://www.bcorporation.net/resour
ces/bcorp/documents/ openminds042610maryland.pdf (The original webpage was 
not available. As such, this source was located on a web archive). 
167  MD. CODE ANN. CORPS & ASS’NS, § 5-6C-01(E) (West 2012). 
168  Danielle Douglas, Benefit Corporations Sign Up, WASH. POST 1, Jan. 24, 2011, at 
A11, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/01/23/AR2011012303556.html. 
169  Megan Burkhart, Ana Castro, & Adrian Sanchez, Maryland Benefit Corporations 
Act: The State of Social Enterprise in Maryland SLIDESHARE 5 (Jan., 2013), 
http://www.slideshare.net/changematters/maryland-benefit-corporations-analysis-
full-report. 
170  Douglas, supra note 168. 
171  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.01 (2012). 
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Corporations or existing corporations can convert to Benefit 
Corporation status as long as two-thirds of the shareholders 
approve.172 At least one board member of the Vermont Benefit 
Corporation must be designated as a benefit director with the 
responsibility for the company’s annual report of its social and 
environmental performance.173 Compared to Maryland, Vermont 
provides more specific guidance regarding the rights of shareholders 
and how the actions of the directors can be challenged.174 
Vermont Benefit Corporations shareholders have legal standing 
to bring a “benefit enforcement proceeding” against the directors for 
a failure to meet the general public benefit purpose or a specific 
purpose adopted in the corporate charter.175 Discussing the new law, 
Jeffrey Hollander, co-founder of Seventh Generation remarked: 
There’s little doubt that there is a financial advantage for 
companies that commit to a corporate philosophy that goes 
beyond profits. I believe that over time there will be 
increasing financial benefits because it will become easier 
for investors, who want to support responsible businesses, to 
identify businesses that are organized primarily around that 
purpose.176 
3. The California Variation 
Effective January, 2012 California introduced two new entities— 
the Benefit Corporation and the Flexible Purpose Corporation.177 
The Benefit Corporation, much like that adopted in Maryland and 
Vermont, is formed for a public purpose and directors will take into 
account the interest of stakeholders, such as shareholders, 
employees, customers, suppliers, the environment, and the 
 
172  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.05(2) (2012). 
173  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10(c) (2012). 
174  Deskins, supra note 132, at 1072. 
175  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §§ 21.09(e), 21.13 (2012).  
176  Bruce Edwards, New Law Keeps with Vt’s Social Conscience, RUTLAND HERALD 2, 
June 13, 2010, available at 
http://www.vermonttoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/RH/20100613/BUSIN
ESS/100619977/-1/VBJ. 
177  Debra Bowen, Two New Types of Corporations Effective January 1, 2012, CAL. SEC’Y 
OF STATE, http://www.oswald-yap.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/flexible-
purpose-corp-and-benefit-corp.pdf(last visited Aug. 19, 2013). 
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community in decision-making.178 The Flexible Purpose Corporation, 
or “FlexC,” is similar to a benefit corporation and in addition 
provides the entity the opportunity to designate an additional 
purpose for which it is formed— its own special purpose in its 
organizing document.179 
In California, retailer Patagonia became the first corporation to 
register as a Benefit Corporation. For Patagonia’s CEO, Yvon 
Chouinard, one of the primary reasons his company adopted Benefit 
Corporation status was the legal recognition of the company’s moral 
mission.180 Mr. Chouinard was outwardly pleased “to know that his 
company, which had become his life’s work, would carry on long after 
him and would be able to stay true to the principles he instilled in 
it.”181 
While the legislative requirements governing Benefit 
Corporations may vary slightly between the states, the need to provide 
a general public benefit represents a common ground between them. 
Since Benefit Corporations are committed to providing a public 
benefit, a question arises as to whether tax benefits should be 
available to support the work of these entities, similar to those tax 
benefits available for nonprofit organizations. To answer this 
question, it is necessary to first explore the nature of the nonprofit 
organization and the rationale upon which tax benefits for nonprofits 
are based. This will be covered in Part IV. Part V will then consider 
whether the nonprofit tax benefits should be extended to Benefit 
Corporations. 
IV. TAX BENEFITS ARE AVAILABLE TO ENTITIES MEETING 
NONPROFIT STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS 
Those nonprofit organizations that meet the statutory 
requirements of Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) receive two 
 
178  Cal. Corp. Code § 14620(b)(2012) (adding Part 13 to Division 3 of Title 1 of 
the Corporations Code, relating to benefit corporations). 
179  The New ABC’s of California Corporations, KAYE & MILLS 2, 
http://www.kayemills.com/articles/new-abcs-of-california-corporations.html (last 
visited Aug. 19, 2013). 
180  Aiden Livingston, To B or Not to B? Weighing the Benefits of Benefit Corporations, 
MASHABLE (Mar. 2, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/03/02/benefit-
corporations/. 
181  Id. 
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primary tax benefits: (1) exemption from taxation on their income 
associated with their exempt activities, and (2) the ability to receive 
tax deductible contributions. Most scholars are in agreement that 
“these tax benefits have contributed to the size and success of the 
charitable sector.”182 Tax-exempt organizations represent a significant 
segment of the national economy.183 In 2010, public charities 
reported $1.51 trillion in revenue, $1.45 trillion in expenses and 
$2.71 trillion in assets, indicating that the revenue of reporting public 
charities grew 40.8 percent over the decade, expenses grew 51.5 
percent, and assets grew 38.1 percent.184 
A. The Tax Preferred Status of Charitable Organizations 
Organizations that come within Code § 501(c)(3) are either 
private foundations or public charities. While a detailed discussion of 
these differences is beyond the purposes and scope of this paper, the 
primary distinction between the two is that a public charity generally 
has more broad based public support than a private foundation.185 A 
more generous charitable contribution deduction is also available for 
contributions made to public charities than those made to private 
foundations.186 
What types of organizations qualify for these tax benefits? Code  
§ 501(c)(3) defines exempt organizations as: 
 
182  Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of 
Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 513 (2010). (Section 501(c)(3) represents 
the most widely known class of exempt organizations and will be the focus of this 
discussion. The Code also recognizes about thirty other categories of tax-exempt 
entities.  These other entities (with a few exceptions) are not eligible to receive tax-
deductible contributions. According to the most recent Statistics of Income released 
by the IRS in December 2012, nonprofit charities exempt under 501(c)(3) reported 
nearly $2.7 trillion in assets and over 1.48 trillion in revenue for 2009); see Paul 
Arnsberger, Nonprofit Charitable Organizations, 2009, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN 1 
(FALL 2012), 
http://www.irs.gov/PUP/taxstats/productsandpubs/12eofallbulteorg.pdf. 
183  Amy S. Blackwood, Katie L. Roeger, & Sarah L. Pettijohn, The Nonprofit Sector 
in Brief: Public Charities, Giving and Volunteering, 2012, URBAN INST. 1, 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412674-The-Nonprofit-Sector-in-Brief.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2014). 
184  Id. 
185  IRS Charity Classification: Private Foundation or Public Charity?, NOLO 
(Aug. 2013),  http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/irs-charity-classification-
private-foundation-public-charity.html. 
186  I.R.C. § 170 (2014). 
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Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or 
foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or 
educational purposes, or to foster national or international 
amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its 
activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or 
equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or 
animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit 
of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the 
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise 
 attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise 
provided . . .), and which does not participate in, or intervene in 
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any 
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any 
candidate for public office.187 
This definition indicates that the 501(c)(3) organization has 
four distinct characteristics: (1) it is organized for an exempt 
purpose; (2) it is operated for an exempt purpose; (3) it ensures that 
net earning do not inure to a private benefit; and (4) it limits its 
political activities.188 
1. Organized for an Exempt Purpose 
To qualify for tax exempt status under 501(c)(3), an 
organization must be organized for charitable exempt purposes.189 
Defining “charitable” for purposes of tax exemption has been the 
subject of much discussion.190 Commentators agree that Congress has 
not given any clear indication of the meaning of “charitable,” 
although there is some support for the notion that the exemption 
broadly provides “benefits resulting from the promotion of the 
general welfare.”191 While charitable goals have been broadly 
interpreted, “as a general rule such organizations must provide some 
 
187  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2014) (emphasis added). 
188  Id. 
189  I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)-(d); § 401(a).  
190  See, e.g., Lars F. Gustafsson, The Definition of “Charitable” for Federal Income Tax 
Purposes: Defrocking the Old and Suggesting Some New Fundamental Assumptions, 33 HOUS. 
L. REV. 587, 590 (1996). 
191  H.R. REP. NO. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938); see also BRUCE R. HOPKINS, 
THE LAW OF TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 5.2 (8th ed. 2003); Gustafsson, supra note 
190, at 596-97. 
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type of ‘community benefit’ in the form of fulfilling needs not being 
met by the private market.”192 In the popular sense, the term 
“charitable” has often been associated with relief for the poor and 
distressed.193 However, the legal sense of the term, which is currently 
found in the Treasury Regulations and used for purposes of tax 
exemption, is much broader: 
The term “charitable” is used in section 501(c)(3) in its 
generally accepted legal sense and is, therefore, not to be 
construed as limited by the separate enumeration in section 
501(c)(3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may fall 
within the broad outlines of “charity” as developed by 
judicial decisions. Such term includes: Relief of the poor 
and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of 
religion; advancement of education or science; erection or 
maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; 
lessening of the burdens of Government; and promotion of 
social welfare by organizations designed to accomplish any 
of the above purposes, or (i) to lessen neighborhood 
tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and discrimination; 
(iii) to defend human and civil rights secured by law; or (iv) 
to combat community deterioration and juvenile 
delinquency.194 
In addition to serving an exempt purpose, the organization 
cannot act contrary to public policy.195 For example, a private school, 
while serving an educational purpose, will not qualify as charitable 
organization unless it adopts a racially nondiscriminatory admissions 
policy.196 In order to meet the statute’s organizational requirement, 
the organization’s articles of incorporation should include: 
(1) a purpose clause, which limits the purposes of the 
organization to one or more exempt purposes described in 
Section 501(c)(3); (2) A powers clause, which limits the 
organization’s activities to those that further its exempt 
purposes; [and] (3) A dissolution article, which dedicates 
 
192  Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and the Charitable Tax Subsidies, 
91 B.U. L. REV. 601, 607 (2011). 
193  HOPKINS, supra note 191, at § 5.1. 
194  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2014).  
195  IRS, 1985 EO CPE Text, ACTIVITIES THAT ARE ILLEGAL OR CONTRARY TO PUBLIC 
POLICY (1985), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicj85.pdf. 
196  Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587.  
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the organization’s assets solely to exempt purposes, and 
ensures that upon dissolution of the organization, any 
remaining assets will be distributed for one or more exempt 
purposes, or to one or more Section 501(c)(3) exempt 
organizations or the federal or state government . . .197 
2. Operated for an Exempt Purpose 
The operational test requires that the organization be operated 
exclusively for one or more exempt purposes.198 This standard is not 
met if more than an insubstantial part of its activities are not in 
furtherance of an exempt purpose. Even if the organization carries 
on a trade or business, this will be permissible as long as the entity 
furthers an exempt purpose.199 
The ability of the nonprofit to engage in an unrelated trade or 
business has always caused concerns about unfair competition with 
for-profit businesses.200 Instances of unfair competition date back as 
far as 1874 when the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City 
began to sell photos of museum paintings to the public.201 New York 
University’s ownership of the Mueller Macaroni Company in the 
1940s, which resulted in Mueller’s nonprofit status, sparked concerns 
of unfair competition that led to the adoption of the unrelated 
business income tax in 1950.202 While the unrelated business income 
tax requires a nonprofit to pay taxes on income that is not related to 
its exempt purpose, the unrelated business income tax does not bring 
in significant tax revenue.203 
The U.S. Small Business Administration identified unfair 
competition as “an issue for the 1980s.”204 It continues to be an issue 
 
197  FRANCES R. HILL & BARBARA L. KIRSCHTEN, FEDERAL AND STATE TAXATION OF 
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 2-67 (1994). 
198  The word “exclusively” has been interpreted to mean “primarily.” Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (2014). 
199  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(iii) and (c)(1). 
200  JAMES T. BENNETT & THOMAS J. DILORENZO, UNFAIR COMPETITION: THE PROFITS 
OF NONPROFITS 1-2 (1989) (citing Edward Skloot, Should Not-For-Profits Go into 
Business? HARV. BUS. REV. (Boston, MA), Jan./Feb., 1983, at 20). 
201  Id. 
202  Id. at 2. 
203  Edward Pound, Gary Cohen, & Penny Loeb, Tax Exempt!, 19 U.S. NEWS AND 
WORLD REPORT (October 2, 1995) at 36. 
204  BENNETT, supra note 200 at 9 (quoting Small Business Administration). U.S. 
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today. The most recent data available from the IRS, for the 2009 tax 
year, indicates that while over 42,000 tax-exempt organizations filed 
an information return, less than half reported any unrelated business 
and most had no tax liability after subtracting deductions from gross 
unrelated business income.205 Consider, for example, the well-known 
organization, The PGA Tour. This entity is exempt from tax under 
Code §501(c), but the income generated by this nonprofit is 
staggering. The PGA Tour had total revenue of approximately $973 
million in 2011 and reported taxable unrelated business income of 
only $1.7 million.206  These figures do not put the PGA Tour at risk of 
loss of its nonprofit status. It is only when the nonprofit 
organization’s primary purpose becomes the furtherance of an 
unrelated trade or business that the organization risks loss of its 
exempt status.207 
3. Private Inurement and Private Benefit Prohibition 
Private inurement is receipt by an organization insider of 
benefits not commensurate with that individual’s contribution to the 
entity (e.g., unreasonable compensation).208 Receipt of more than an 
incidental private benefit by those who are not insiders is also 
prohibited, unless the benefit is received as part of the organization’s 
exempt activities.209 If an organization operates for the benefit of the 
creator of the organization, her family, or others associated with the 
organization, the organization does not operate for an exempt 
purpose.210 According to the legislative history, the language against 
private inurement was added to “provide assurance that the 
exemption for charities was limited only to those institutions that 
 
Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy. 1984. Unfair competition by 
nonprofit organizations with small businesses: An issue for the 80’s, 3rd ed., 
Washington, D.C. Office of the Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business 
Administration. 
205  Unrelated Business Income, Tax Year 2009, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/09ubisnapshot.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2013). 
206  PGA TOUR Form 990 (2011) available at 
http://www.espn.go.com/pdf/2013/121313/OTL_-_PGATour990.pdf.  
207  Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). 
208  See generally IRS, 1990 CPE Text, TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS WITH FOR-PROFIT 
SUBSIDIARIES, available at http://www.sdlaw.com/files/Download/subsidiaries.htm. 
209  Id. 
210  Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1065–66 (1989).  
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have no element of personal gain and that are exclusively devoted to 
exempt purposes.”211 
4. Political Activities 
The Code imposes limitations on the political activities of 
charitable organizations.212 Since 1954, charities have been prohibited 
from participating in political campaign activity, which includes 
activities such as contributing campaign funds, endorsing a 
candidate, or displaying campaign signs, or distributing literature for 
a candidate.213 A charitable organization can engage in a certain 
amount of lobbying activities.214 Rather, the requirement is that such 
activities not be substantial.215 In addition, charitable organizations 
are permitted to engage in advocacy.216 For example, an organization 
is permitted to advocate for or against legislation related to the 
environment, but must not use that advocacy as a way of taking a 
position for or against a particular candidate for public office.217 
B. Why Offer Tax Benefits To Charity? 
The notion of preferred tax status for organizations with a social 
purpose or public mission is not unique to our modern tax system. As 
illustrated in Table 3, preferential tax treatment pre-dates the passage 
of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913.218 
 
211  44 Cong. Rec. 4150 (1909) (remarks of Sen. Bacon). 
212  Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3). 
213  Id. 
214  Id. 
215  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (2014). The IRS 
has explained that the determination of whether such activities are substantial will be 
determined bases on all the relevant facts and circumstances, including the time and 
expense devoted to these actions. See IRS, Measuring Lobbying: Substantial Part Test, 
http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Measuring-Lobbying:-Substantial-Part-
Test. 
216  Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii)(b) (2014). 
217  Mary Ann Hofmann, Political Activity: A Primer for Nonprofits, 30 NONPROFIT 
WORLD 20 (2012). 
218  U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
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Table 3: The Development of the Rules for Tax Exempt 
Organizations219 
ACT TAX TREATMENT
Tariff Act 
of 
1894 
First statutory Federal income tax exemption for 
charitable organizations: “nothing herein 
contained shall apply to …corporations…or 
associations organized and conducted solely for 
charitable, religious, or educational purposes.” 
The Payne 
Aldrich 
Tariff Act of 
1909 
Exempted from corporate excise tax “any 
corporation or association organized and operated 
exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational 
purposes, no part of the income of which inures to 
the benefit of any private stockholder or 
individual.” 
Tariff Act 
of 
1913 
Exempts from Federal income tax “any 
corporation or association organized and operated 
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or 
educational, no part of the net income of which 
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual.” 
1917 
Income 
Tax Act 
Charitable contribution deduction added for 
contributions to organizations and associations 
organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, or 
to societies for the prevention of cruelty to 
children and animals.
 
Notwithstanding the significance of charities in our society and 
the history of these provisions, “no consensus exists as to the purpose 
of either tax exemption or the charitable deduction.”220 A variety of 
reasons have been given to explain the tax benefits accorded to 
nonprofit entities: (1) taxation is based on the wherewithal to pay, 
(2) these organizations relieve a government burden by providing 
goods and/or services that the government would otherwise have to 
provide, (3) nonprofits promote pluralism, and (4) nonprofits are 
efficient providers but have limited access to capital. 
 
219  STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
AND PRESENT LAW OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (2005). 
220  Fleischer, Theorizing, supra note 182, at 514. 
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1. Wherewithal to Pay 
Boris Bittker and George Rahdert support the tax exemption for 
nonprofits, in part, based on the fact that the nonprofits do not have 
the “ability to pay,” which is one of the foundations on which taxation 
is based.221 Since nonprofits lack a profit motive and generally 
distribute their funds to beneficiaries, calculating adjusted gross 
income for these organizations is administratively infeasible.222 If tax-
exempt organizations were stripped of their exempt status, 
“computing their ‘net income’ would be a conceptually difficult, if 
not self-contradictory task.”223 According to Bittker and Rahdert, this 
difficulty results from the legal and accounting principles by which 
adjusted gross income is calculated, because those principles are 
based on the fact that the organization operates under a profit 
motive.224 For example, there is the issue of whether dues and 
contributions would be the considered gifts or business income. On 
the expenditure side, there is the issue of whether the expenses for 
the conduct of the organization’s activities would be deductible as 
ordinary and necessary expenses or non-deductible since they were 
not spent in furtherance of a profit motivated activity.225 
Even if this income could be measured, Bittker and Rahdert 
assert it would be difficult to set tax rates on this income since this tax 
would ultimately be paid by the nonprofit’s beneficiaries.226 In fact, if 
these entities were taxed, the “predictable losers would be the 
beneficiaries.”227 Henry Hansmann is one scholar who has taken issue 
with these conclusions on the grounds that most income of 
nonprofits comes not from contributions but from the sale of goods 
or services, and even if such income came from contributions, 
making a matching of expenses and income is less complex than 
perhaps Bittker and Rahdert suggest.228 
 
221  Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations 
from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 305 (1976).  
222  Id. at 307. 
223  Id.  
224  Id. at 307-08. 
225  Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis, 
Antithesis, and Syntheses, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395, 409 (1997). 
226  Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 221, at 305. 
227  Atkinson, supra note 225, at 409. 
228  Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofits from Federal Income 
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2. The Public Benefit and Relief of a Government Burden 
One of the most compelling reasons supporting the federal tax 
benefits for nonprofit organizations is that these organizations 
produce public goods, goods that provide a public benefit.229 These 
goods or services can either be considered inherently good or can be 
provided to those who are in need.230 “Charities provide primary 
public benefits in two ways; especially good goods to ordinary people, 
and ordinary goods to the especially deserving.”231 In a thin market, 
“demand for a product is so small that no commercial firm could 
make a profit selling it. Because of their subsidies which artificially 
lower costs, nonprofits can serve such a market.”232 Jurists have 
recognized the value of this function as well. In a concurring opinion 
in a case involving a New York tax exemption, Supreme Court Justice 
Brennan stated that, “private, nonprofit organizations contribute to 
the well-being of the community . . . and thereby bear the burdens 
that would otherwise have to be met by general taxation, or be left 
undone, to the detriment of the community.”233 “[T]he [g]overnment 
is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from the financial 
burden which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations 
from other public funds.”234 
There is also the possibility of market or contract failure.235 In 
order for a market to operate efficiently, ideally consumers would be 
able to assess the quality of goods or services prior to purchase.236 In 
 
Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 59 (1981). 
229  Id. at 68. 
230  Atkinson, supra note 225, at 402. 
231  Id. 
232  BENNETT & DILORENZO, supra note 200, at 26.   
233  Walz v. Tax Comm’n of the City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (Brennan, J. 
concurring). 
234  H.R. REP. NO. 75-1860, at 19 (1938). 
235  Henry Hansmann, The Role of the Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 849-51 
(1980) (advocating this theory) (cited by Lester M. Salamon & Helmut K. Anheier, 
Social Origins of Civil Society: Explaining the Nonprofit Sector Cross-Nationally 1, 14 (John 
Hopkins Comp. Nonprofit Sector Project, Working Paper No. 22 1996), available at 
http://ccss.jhu.edu/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2011/09/CNP_WP22_1996.pdf ; also cited by Barbara 
Bucholtz, Reflections of the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a Representative Democracy, 7 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 555, 567-68 (1998)). 
236  Henry Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in ECONOMIC 
THEORIES OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 27-42 (W. Powell, ed., 1987) available at 
ARTICLE_ALEXANDER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/9/2014  1:57 PM 
2014] BENEFIT CORPORATIONS 261 
 
instances where this is not possible, a for-profit entity may have an 
incentive to curtail quality to enhance profits whereas a nonprofit 
that is unable to distribute net earnings does not have the same 
incentive to lower quality.237 This results in a public perception that 
goods provided by a nonprofit are of higher quality.238 
3. Promoting Pluralism 
Pluralism is another often-cited rationale for the tax exemption 
of nonprofits.239 “[T]he promotion of a healthy pluralism is often 
viewed as a prime social benefit of general significance.”240 Advocates 
of this theory “emphasize the role that charities play in providing 
creative and diverse solutions to society’s problems in offering 
alternative viewpoints in the arts and culture, in countering 
government power, and . . . enhancing experimentation.”241 Having a 
charitable deduction in place allows the individual taxpayer to be 
more engaged in deciding which projects should receive support 
thereby likely increasing the individual’s commitment to that 
particular project.242 Allowing a deduction for charitable 
contributions is more efficient than direct grants made by the 
government because direct grants would likely require a broad based 
income tax increase which might not be in proportion to how much a 
taxpayer values the good or service being subsidized.243 This method 
does not require value-based judgments, with the only inquiry being 
whether the entity provides public goods or service.244 Allowing 
taxpayers to have a say in which projects to fund, as opposed to 
having the government direct such efforts, enhances pluralism and 
 
http://www.ppge.ufrgs.br/giacomo/arquivos/eco02072/hansmann-1987.pdf. 
237   Id. 
238  While this issue is beyond the scope of this article, interested readers may wish 
to consult BENNET & DILORENZO, supra note 200, and Hansmann, supra note 228, for 
consideration of whether the higher quality perception represents reality. 
239  Fleischer, Equality, supra note 192, at 610. 
240  Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1162 (D.D.C.), aff’d sub nom. Coit v. 
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). 
241  Fleischer, Equality, supra note 192, at 610. 
242  Id. at 613 (citing Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. R. 387, 406 
(1998)). 
243  Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contribution Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 
1393, 1404 (1988). 
244  Fleischer, Equality, supra note 192, at 612.  
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often results in a greater commitment by the individual to the 
project.245 The donative intent behind voluntary contributions to 
charitable organizations is also considered an indication of a good or 
service being undersupplied either in the market or by the 
government, and thus in need of a subsidy.246 
4. Limited Ability to Raise Capital 
Hansmann was one of the first to apply an economic subsidy 
based argument for tax exemption.247 Relying on economic theory, 
Henry Hansmann concluded that the prohibitions against private 
inurement and distributions of net earnings make it difficult for 
nonprofit organizations to attract capital.248 Their inability to raise 
adequate capital, maintains Hansmann, prevents them from 
operating as efficiently as possible.249 In addition, Hansmann asserts 
that nonprofits are also susceptible to contract failure, meaning for 
example, that donors pledging an amount to an organization for a 
specific purpose could not verify whether, in fact, the funds were put 
toward that purpose.250 In Hansmann’s view, the tax exemption 
afforded to nonprofit organizations served as a necessary subsidy to 
help negate these detriments.251 Taking the view that contract failure 
was the key for obtaining the subsidy allowed Hansmann to support 
the subsidy without reference to the merits of the goods or services 
provided.252 
It should be noted that movements in the social sector have 
been underway to improve the ability of nonprofits to raise capital by 
helping to increase the exchange of information between nonprofits 
and donors.253 New intermediate organizations, such as the Robin 
Hood Foundation and New Profit, evaluate the performance of 
 
245  Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 405-07 (1998)). 
246  JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION, 147-48 
(1995) 
247  Fleischer, Theorizing, supra note 182 at 518.   
248  Hansmann, supra note 228 at 72-75.  
249  Id. at 72 
250  Id. at 67-69. 
251  Id. at 75. 
252  See generally Fleischer, Equality, supra note 192, at 609 n.30 (discussing the 
economic subsidy theory and others).   
253  See, e.g., Robert S. Kaplan & Allen S. Grossman, The Emerging Capital Market for 
Nonprofits, HARV. BUS. REV. (Boston, MA), Oct. 2010, at 114. 
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nonprofits to monitor which use donations most effectively by 
reporting on the social outcomes achieved by the entity.254 This 
information will help direct donor funds to the most-effective 
nonprofits. 
V. TAX EXPENDITURES ARE AN IMPROPER SUBSIDY FOR 
BENEFIT CORPORATIONS 
“Taxes are the price we pay for a civilized society,” is an often-
quoted rationalization for the necessity of a broad based system of 
taxation.255 The tax structure plays a major role in shaping social 
issues. Tax structures in competitive political systems, such as that 
which we have in the United States, are part of a political 
equilibrium.256 Whether it is the tax incentives provided for 
homeowners that encourage home ownership, the accelerated 
depreciation deductions that encourage business investment, the 
deductions for charitable contributions that encourage charitable 
giving, the social security payments to ensure assistance in retirement, 
the progressive tax rates, or the excise taxes imposed on tobacco 
products that discourage such purchases, there is no doubt that tax 
policies shape society.257 “[C]ompetition between political parties for 
support from utility maximizing voters of differing political influence 
forces the government to choose a tax structure based on the loss in 
support— or, political costs— associated with different tax sources.”258 
For example, the federal budget debate over the most effective use of 
government resources has no doubt been shaped not only by the 
current economic downturn, but also by differences between the 
 
254  Id.  
255  Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 
275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes’ statement from his 
dissent is engraved above the entrance to the IRS Headquarters in Washington, D.C. 
256  See Lawrence W. Kenny & Stanley L. Winer, Tax Systems in the World: An 
Empirical Investigation into the Importance of Tax Bases, Administration Costs, Scale and 
Political Regime, 13 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 181, 181 (2006). 
257  I.R.C. § 163(h) (homeowner tax incentive); I.R.C. § 168 (accelerated cost 
recovery); I.R.C. § 170 (charitable deduction); 42 U.S.C. § 402 (Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance Benefit Payments) (2012); I.R.C. § 1 (tax rates); I.R.C. § 5701 
(tax on tobacco products); see also Mystica Alexander & Timothy Gagnon, The Roberts 
Court: Using the Taxing Power to Shape Individual Behavior, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
345, 350-54 (2012) (discussing the effects of tax policies on society). 
258  Kenny & Winer, supra note 256, at 183.   
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political parties.259 
A. Tax Expenditures Are Subsidies 
It is important to understand the broader tax structure within 
which the tax preference for nonprofit organizations is expressed. 
The tax system is at the heart of the debate over the federal budget 
and the question of how to lead American out of its economic 
downturn. Faced with a deficit of $15 trillion, lawmakers on both 
sides of the political aisle recognize that a valid budget initiative must 
include government spending cuts, although a consensus cannot 
seem to be reached on where those cuts should be.260 And while the 
concept of direct spending is readily understood (e.g., government 
support of Social Security and Medicaid), the term “tax expenditure,” 
which represents indirect government spending, is less well known.261 
More commonly known as tax breaks or loopholes, tax expenditures 
are “departures from the normal tax structure . . . designed to favor a 
particular industry, activity, or class of persons.”262 
1. Tax-Favored Treatment is Tantamount to a Direct 
Expenditure 
The term “tax expenditure” is attributed to Stanley Surrey, 
former Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury for Tax Policy during 
the Kennedy Administration, who was convinced that some tax 
preference provisions in the Internal Revenue Code were essentially 
forms of government spending, although not treated as such for 
 
259  See generally Tom Cohen, Hope for Compromise Recedes as Budget Debate Begins, 
CNN (Mar. 14, 2013), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/13/politics/obama-congress/.    
260  See, e.g., Annie Lowrey, Balanced Budget Dispute is Fiscal and Philosophical, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2013, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/us/politics/balanced-budget-fight-is-
philosophical-and-fiscal.html; see also Brian Knowlton, The Battle in Congress on 
Spending and Debt, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 29, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/30/us/politics/questions-and-answers-on-a-
possible-government-shutdown.html?_r=0. 
261  See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL MCDANIEL, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF TAX 
EXPENDITURES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 9 (1985) (summarizing the tax expenditure 
concept). 
262  PAUL  R. MCDANIEL & STANLEY S. SURREY, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF TAX 
EXPENDITURES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 3 (1985).  
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budget purposes.263 He believed these provisions were favored by 
politicians to provide subsidies that might not otherwise be feasible if 
subject to the same scrutiny received by direct government spending 
programs.264 In 1967, Secretary Surrey directed his staff to compile a 
list of the tax provisions that were in the nature of expenditures, and 
he advocated that production of such a list be incorporated as a 
mandatory annual requirement.265 In response to this, the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 requires the Administration to 
annually report tax expenditures as part of the annual budget 
submission.266 While these are included in the budget submission, 
interestingly, these expenditures do not impact budget/spending 
and the information on tax expenditures can only be found in the 
appendix to the submission.267 “In Washington, however, tax 
expenditures aren’t considered spending programs. They’re 
considered tax breaks.”268 
Picking up on Surrey’s theme of the problem with tax 
expenditures, political scientist Chris Howard has dubbed these 
expenditures the “hidden welfare state.”269 To Howard, “the hidden 
welfare state illustrates a greater range of political possibilities for 
social programs in the United States than we are accustomed to 
seeing.”270 Since tax expenditures generally do not undergo the same 
degree of analysis as direct spending, the criteria by which they are to 
be evaluated are often not clearly articulated resulting in a certain 
 
263  Jeffrey H. Kahn, Personal Deductions: A Tax “Ideal” or Just Another “Deal”?, 2002 
L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C. L. 1, 9 (2002). 
264  STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 3 (1985)Id. 
265  Bruce Bartlett, Spending Through the Tax Code, FORBES, May 28, 2010, available 
at  http://www.forbes.com/2010/05/27/finance-economy-tax-code-opinions-
columnists-bruce-bartlett.html. 
266  Congressional Budget Impound Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 
Stat. 297 (1976).  
267  Leonard Burman & Marvin Phaup, Tax Expenditures: The Big Government 
Behind the Curtain, VOX EU (Nov. 17, 2011), 
http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7287. 
268  Brad Plumer, Why You Should Care About Tax Expenditures (Really), WASH. POST 
(Sept. 1, 2011, 3:17 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/why-you-should-care-about-
tax-expenditures-really/2011/09/01/gIQAEr2quJ_blog.html. 
269  CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES AND 
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (1997). 
270  Id. 
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level of ambiguity that shifts the costs of administration away from the 
government and on to individuals, corporations, and other parties.271 
Suzanne Mettler refers to tax expenditures as “the submerged 
state.”272 As two commentators suggest, Mettler claims that “the 
relative invisibility of tax expenditures undermines democracy 
because their relative obscurity makes it more difficult for citizens to 
understand how government programmes affect them. Lobbyists can 
sneak expensive ineffective subsidies into the tax code that would 
never pass muster as direct spending programmes— think ethanol 
tax credits.”273 As a result of this, voters may not fully understand the 
cost of expenditures, allowing the government to be larger and more 
inefficient than might be permitted if citizens had full information.274 
2. Tax Expenditures Amount to One-Quarter of Total 
Government Spending 
The economic effect of tax expenditures is substantial. A recent 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper states that 
based on Treasury estimates, 2011 income tax expenditures by the 
federal government will amount to $1.2 trillion.275 Overall, income tax 
expenditures amount to one-quarter of total spending.276 Ranking 
number seven on a list of the ten largest tax expenditures in 2011 was 
the Charitable Deduction totaling $43.9 billion.277 
B. Subsidies are Improper for Benefit Corporations Because Benefit 
Corporations are not Like Charities 
Given the Benefit Corporation’s focus on serving a social 
 
271  Id. This shift in costs results from the ever-increasing time and cost associated 
with the complexity of the Tax Code. 
272  Suzanne Mettler, Reconstituting the Submerged State: The Challenges of Social Policy 
Reform in the Obama Era, 8 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 803, 804 (2010). 
273  Leonard Burman & Marvin Phaup, Tax Expenditures: The Big Government 
Behind the Curtain, VOX EU (Nov. 17, 2011), 
http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7287. 
274  Id.  
275  Leonard E. Burman & Marvin Phaup, Tax Expenditures, The Size and Efficiency of 
Government, and Implications for Budget Reform 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 17268, 2011), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17268.pdf?new_window=1. 
276  Id. 
277  Id. at 9. 
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mission, it is not surprising that some have considered the possibility 
of special tax privileges for such entities.278 At present, these 
organizations receive no federal tax benefits similar to those available 
to charitable organizations, although there are signs that there may 
be calls for such treatment on the road ahead.279 For example, 
Philadelphia became the first city in the nation to provide a financial 
incentive for sustainable businesses when a tax concession for a for-
profit Certified B Corporation branded entity (“B Corp.”) at the local 
level was adopted in 2009.280 For 2012 through 2017, twenty-five 
eligible B-Lab corporations, or other organizations meeting 
sustainability standards, will receive a $4,000 tax credit against the 
Business Privilege Tax.281 
Before considering whether Benefit Corporations should qualify 
for special federal tax treatment, such as that reserved for nonprofit 
organizations, it is important to note that there is an ever-increasing 
blurred line between nonprofit and for-profit entities. For-profit 
social enterprises are increasingly stepping into roles traditionally 
held by the government or nonprofit sector and are fully willing to 
put public mission above profitability. Take, for example, Google.org, 
the philanthropic, yet for-profit, arm of Google.282 Google.org is 
 
278  For example, Andrew Kassoy, co-founder of B-Lab, has stated that the goal 
“will be to use this new corporate form as a platform for states or municipalities or 
federal governments to offer procurement, investment, or tax incentives for benefit 
companies. So in the dream scenario when you have companies obligated to create 
public benefit you can measure the externalities those companies are internalizing 
and say they should be taxed at a lower rate than a C corporation.” The B Corporation: 
A Business Model for the New Economy, CAPITAL INST. (last updated Aug. 2012), 
http://capitalinstitute.org/metrics/b-corporation-business-model-new-
economy#.Uzq5bk1OW70. 
279  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, §5 (2014) (exempting the personal property 
of charitable organization from local taxation, but no such exemption exists for the 
property of state Benefit Corporations). 
280  PHILA., PA., CODE § 19-2604(10) (2009), available at 
http://www.phila.gov/philacode/html/_data/title19/chapter_19_2600_business_pri
vi/19_2601_Definitions_.html. 
281  PHILA., PA., CODE § 19-2604(10)(c)(i), available at 
http://www.phila.gov/philacode/html/_data/title19/chapter_19_2600_business_pri
vi/19_2601_Definitions_.html. 
282  See Sheryl Sandberg, About Google.org, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Oct. 11, 2005), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2005/10/about-googleorg.html; see also Katie 
Hafner, Philanthropy Google’s Way: Not the Usual, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/14/technology/14google.html?pagewanted=all&
_r=0 (stating that “unlike most charities,” Google.org is for-profit). 
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considered for-profit because it is free to distribute its profits, but it is 
nonprofit in its mission, which is to address some of the world’s 
problems, rather than to obtain profit maximization.283 Google’s 
announcement of its creation of a for-profit charity caused mixed 
reactions both within and outside of the nonprofit sector.284 
For example, Marcus S. Owens, a tax lawyer in Washington who 
spent a decade as director of the exempt organizations division of the 
Internal Revenue Service, expressed concern over the organization’s 
long-term ability to maintain its dedicated funding: “‘It’s possible the 
shareholders of Google might someday object, especially if we go into 
an economic depression and that money is needed to shore up the 
company.’”285 Professors Malani and Posner argue that Google.org’s 
for-profit status will pose an obstacle to fulfilling its goals: 
The problem with for-profit charities is that they forfeit all 
the state and federal tax benefits available to nonprofit 
charities . . . For example, even if the Google charity is 
successful, Google may be reluctant to increase funding of 
the entity and the charity may have difficulty raising funds 
from donors because contributions to the for-profit Google 
charity are not deductible. This raises a puzzle. . . . If it 
turns out that Google’s charitable efforts benefit poor 
countries more effectively that those of nonprofits with 
similar missions, why should the tax code steer donors to 
the nonprofits rather than to Google?286 
Tax benefits for Benefit Corporations are unadvisable for three 
reasons: (1) It is by no means certain that the purposes of the Benefit 
Corporation will dovetail with those in Code § 501(c)(3) and 
accompanying regulations and the corporation’s fulfillment of public 
purposes is not easily assessed; (2) Benefit Corporations do not 
 
283  See Hafner, supra note 282. 
284  See Christopher Quay, Nonprofit Sector Has Mixed Reactions to Google’s For-Profit 
Charity, NAT’L COMMITTEE FOR RESPONSIVE PHILANTHROPY (Sept. 15, 2006), 
https://www.ncrp.org/news-room/news-2006/296-nonprofit-sector-has-mixed-
reactions-to-googles-for-profit-charity (Noting that while Diana Aviv, the CEO of 
Independent Sector is “optimistic about Google.org's decision to operate as a for-
profit,” the executive director of the National Committee for Responsive 
Philanthropy, Richard Cohen, expressed concern over “questions of reporting, 
accountability, and oversight that are pretty daunting for the philanthropic sector”). 
285  Hafner, supra note 282. 
286  Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 
2017, 2020 (2007). 
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operate under the same distribution and private inurement 
restrictions as nonprofit organizations; and (3) Extending nonprofit 
tax benefits to Benefit Corporations will undermine the efforts of the 
charitable sector. 
1. Benefit Corporations Do Not By Definition Engage in 
Charitable Activities and the Extent to Which They 
Fulfill a Public Purpose is Not Easily Assessed 
As explained at the start of Part IV, the Internal Revenue Code 
and accompanying Treasury Regulations place limitations on the 
types of activities that an entity can engage in to qualify for the tax 
benefits of Code §501(c)(3).287 The organization must be both 
organized and operated to further an exempt purpose.288 Through 
these exempt activities, charitable organizations provide public goods 
that would otherwise have to be provided by the government.289 
More recently, scholars have begun to call for a reassessment 
and expansion of the tax benefits provided to nonprofits to the for-
profit social enterprise sector. Relying on the example of Grameen 
Bank, a nonprofit Bangladeshi organization whose social mission is to 
“decrease poverty in rural Bangladesh by granting small, collateral-
free loans primarily to poor women villagers,”290 Hadley Rose has 
called for an expansion of Code § 501(c)(3) to include social 
enterprises formed to meet both social and economic goals.291 Rose 
points out that if Grameen Bank were operated under US charity law, 
its nonprofit status would be in jeopardy.292 
Professors Malani and Posner also argue that nonprofit form 
should not be a prerequisite to tax subsidies. They note that if the 
 
287  See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-(1) (as amended in 
2008). 
288  Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)-(c) (as amended in 2008). 
289  See, e.g., Malani and Posner, supra note 286 at 2029-31 and Hansman, supra 
note 235 at 848-49. 
290  Hadley Rose, Comment, The Social Business: The Viability of a New Business Entity 
Type, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 131, 131 (2007). 
291  Id. at 149-56. 
292  Id. at 134 (“In the US, the Bank would be in danger of running afoul of 
numerous exemption doctrines, including the exempt purpose requirement, the 
commerciality doctrine, the private benefit doctrine, the prohibition against certain 
joint ventures, the Unrelated Business Income Tax (‘UBIT’) and the Excess Benefit 
Tax (‘EBT’)”). 
ARTICLE_ALEXANDER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/9/2014  1:57 PM 
270 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 38:2 
 
public goods theory is what underlies tax breaks for charitable 
nonprofits then “the tax deduction for charitable contribution 
should be made available to any firm for-profit or nonprofit— that 
engages in appropriate activities that benefit third parties.”293 They 
argue that if tax breaks are to be provided for community-benefit 
activities at all, they should be based only on the fact that a 
community benefit is being provided, not on whether the entity 
meets the requirements of the nonprofit form.294 Even if one agrees 
with this position, it is unclear how “community benefit” is to be 
defined for this purpose. Presumably, for-profit entities seeking 
nonprofit tax breaks should have to meet the activity standards of 
Code § 501(c)(3). However, applying this approach to Benefit 
Corporations is problematic, as there is no one provision that defines 
the parameters of the Benefit Corporation’s social mission, let alone 
not one that neatly fits within the definition of charitable activities 
upon which Code §501(c)(3) is based.295 
A look at the Vermont Benefit Corporation statute is instructive 
on this point.296 The statute requires a benefit corporation to “have 
the purpose of creating general public benefit,”297 which in turn is 
defined as “a material positive impact on society and the 
environment, as measured by a third-party standard, through 
activities that promote some combination of specific public 
benefits.”298 Notably, however the statute does not require that the 
general public benefit be consistent with the charitable activities 
defined in Code § 501(c)(3). Further, glaringly absent is any hint at a 
limitation on those Benefit Corporation activities that will not further 
a general or specific public benefit. Such a limitation is a hallmark of 
a nonprofit enterprise.299 Without some limitation, taxpayers would 
 
293  Malani & Posner, supra note 286, at 2030-31. 
294  Id. at 2064-2065. 
295  See Joseph M. Binder, A Tax Analysis of the Emerging Class of Hybrid Entities, 78 
BROOK. L. REV. 625, 651-52 (2013) (arguing that, because of the “unusually broad list 
of activities” that allow a B corporation satisfy B-Lab’s broad purpose standards, a B 
corporation may qualify as such without actually “reliev[ing] the government of the 
need to provide public goods or services”) 
296  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.01 et seq. (2012). 
297  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.08(a) (2012). 
298  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(4) (2012). 
299  See I.R.C. 501(c)(3) (2012); Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-1(a) (as amended in 
2008) (providing that an organization must be both organized and operated 
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subsidize not only the public benefits provided by the Benefit 
Corporation, but also those activities engaged in purely to maximize 
profits. Distinguishing between the two would also impose 
administrative challenges. 
Consider the scope of the recent Benefit Corporation law 
enacted in Delaware on July 17, 2013, with an effective date of August 
1, 2013.300 Delaware requires that the Benefit Corporation be 
intended to produce a public benefit, which is defined as “a positive 
effect (or reduction of negative effects) on [one] or more categories 
of persons, entities, communities[,] or interests . . . including, but not 
limited to, effects of an artistic, charitable, cultural, economic, 
educational, environmental, literary, medical, religious, scientific[,] 
or technological nature.”301 Given the breadth of this definition, it 
cannot be said that a Delaware Benefit Corporation necessarily serves 
a charitable purpose, or supplies a public good that the government 
would otherwise have to provide. Several other states contain similarly 
problematic definitions of “general public benefit” or “public 
benefit”: 
  
 
exclusively for one or more exempt purposes). 
300  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 361 (2014). 
301  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a)-(b) (2014). 
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Table 4: Defining a General Public Benefit 
STATES
Arkansas, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts 
Nevada, New York, Oregon, South Carolina, Rhode Island, 
Virginia, Washington D.C. 
STATUTORY LANGUAGE
“General public benefit” means a material positive impact on society and 
the environment, taken as a whole, assessed against a third party 
standard, from the business and operations of a benefit corporation.302 
STATE
COLORADO
STATUTORY LANGUAGE
“Public benefit” means one or more positive effects or reduction of 
negative effects on one or more categories of persons, entities, 
communities, or interests other than shareholders in their capacities as 
shareholders, including effects of an artistic, charitable, cultural, 
economic, educational, environmental, literary, medical, religious, 
scientific, or technological nature.303 
STATE
NEW JERSEY AND VERMONT
STATUTORY LANGUAGE
“General public benefit” means a material positive impact on society and 
the environment by the operations of a benefit corporation through 
activities that promote some combination of specific public benefits.304 
 
While states vary somewhat in their definitions of “public 
benefit” or “general public benefit,” one commonality is that they all 
define the term broadly. Kyle Westaway and Dirk Sampselle highlight 
concerns with the breadth and ambiguity of the general public 
 
302  ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-36-103(a)(5) (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2402(3) 
(2014); CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(c) (West 2014); D.C. CODE § 29-1301.02(a)(5) 
(2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-2 (2013); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40 § 1.10 (2013); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1803(A)(6) (2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, § 2 (2014); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78B.040 (West 2014); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1702(b) (2014); 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.750(3) (West 2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-
130(A)(5)(McKinney 2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.3-2(5) (2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 
13.1-782 (2013). 
303  COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-503(2) (2013). 
304  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1(2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(4) (2014). 
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benefit language.305 First, they note that the term “material” is not 
defined.306 Further, they argue, “society and environment are words 
conjuring enormous concepts so nebulous and extensive that it is 
difficult to know their actual or intended limits[.]”307 Finally, the “as 
assessed against a third-party” language raises a question as to 
whether “a benefit corporation that fails to meet its third-party 
standard’s requirements also fail[s] to uphold its purpose of creating 
a general public benefit” or whether it is simply a “threshold duty of a 
benefit corporation simply to find a third-party standard to assess its 
pursuit of its material impacts.”308 
In addition, as explained in Part II, at present definitive statutory 
guidance on how to assess whether a Benefit Corporation is fulfilling 
its public purpose is virtually nonexistent. Granted, the model 
legislation, as adopted by many states, requires the Benefit 
Corporation to submit an Annual Benefit Report which has been 
prepared in accordance with third party standard to ensure that 
organizational decisions have been made in accordance with the 
entity’s general or specific public purposes, but these requirements 
are vague.309 Further, there is no requirement that the Annual Report 
be reviewed or audited by the third party, only that the Benefit 
Corporation directors adopt some third party standard, but no 
particular standard is required.310 There is also no statutory 
 
305  Kyle Westaway & Dirk Sampselle, The Benefit Corporation: An Economic Analysis 
with Recommendations to Courts, Boards, and Legislatures, 62 Emory L.J. 999, 1034 
(2013). 
306  Id. 
307  Id. 
308  Id. 
309  See, for example, the Benefit Corporation of Arkansas (§4-36-103(a)(10)), 
which explains that the third party standard should be comprehensive in considering 
stakeholder, and developed by an entity that is independent of the Benefit 
Corporation, has adequate expertise in corporate social and environmental policy to 
be considered credible, and is transparent, meaning that information about the third 
party is publicly available.  Absent is any specific discussion of what types of action 
may be considered socially responsible and guidance on how the relative interests of 
stakeholders are to be weighed. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-36-103(a)(10) (LexisNexis 2013), 
available at 
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2013/2013R/Pages/BillInformation.aspx?m
easureno=HB1510.  
310  See, for example, B-Lab’s explanation of the adoption of a third party 
standard, which essentially vests all discretion with the board. How Do I Select a Third 
Party Standard?, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., http://benefitcorp.net/third-party-
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framework for the third party review that explains how the 
performance standards are to be assessed, especially in light of the 
fact that Benefit Corporations are intended to take into account the 
effect of decisions on an array of stakeholders, not just the effect on 
the beneficiaries of its activities.311 
It should also be noted that not all states have adopted the 
Annual Benefit Report Requirement. Delaware, for example, simply 
requires that a statement be made every two years, only to 
shareholders, that identifies the objectives the board has established 
to promote public benefit and the standards the board has applied to 
measure how well the entity has met those objectives.312 Not only does 
the most recent Delaware statute not require any public reporting, 
annually or otherwise, but also does not mandate third party 
assessment.313 Directors self-assess their actions and report to 
shareholders. 
Concern about the lack of restrictions under which Benefit 
Corporations operate as opposed to those imposed on nonprofit 
entities was highlighted in a dispute in San Francisco over proposed 
legislation that would give special incentives to Benefit Corporations 
seeking city contracts.314 The chief executive officer of the California 
Association of Nonprofits, Jan Masaoka, argued against any special 
treatment for Benefit Corporations based on this lack of regulation: 
“[t]here’s no basis— of either historical disadvantage or evidence of 
benefit— to give these kind of nonprofit-like privileges to for-profit 
companies that have virtually no regulation or restrictions.”315 
 
standards/overview (last visited May 20, 2014).  See also, for example, Arizona 
Benefit Corporation Statue which makes clear that a third party standard provider 
does not have to audit and certify the annual report. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 4-10-2441 
(LexisNexis 2014), available at 
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/51leg/1r/adopted/h.1238-se-com.pdf. 
311  Model Legislation §301(a), available at 
http://benefitcorp.net/attorneys/model-legislation. 
312  DEL. CODE. ANN. tit 8, § 366(b)(2013). 
313  DEL. CODE. ANN. tit 8, § 366(c)(3) (providing that the bylaws of a public 
benefit corporation may require third-party assessment of the corporation’s 
promotion of a public benefit). 
314  See Mark Hrywna, Benefit Corporation in California Meets Chill in San Francisco, 
THE NONPROFIT TIMES (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.thenonprofittimes.com/news-
articles/benefit-corporation-in-california-meets-chill-in-san-francisco/. 
315  Id. 
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2.    Benefit Corporations Do Not By Definition Abide by 
the Non-distribution Constraint and Therefore Do Not 
Have Limited Access to Capital 
The Benefit Corporation is a for-profit entity that is ultimately 
accountable only to its shareholders, even though decisions will be 
made which take into account the interests of a broad array of 
stakeholders.316 As a for-profit entity there is an expectation that 
investors will receive a return on their investment, albeit likely a lower 
rate of return than would be expected from a purely profit driven 
entity.317 As per Code §501(c)(3), the net earnings of a nonprofit 
organization cannot inure to the benefit of any organizational 
insider.318 Even those who are not insiders cannot receive any 
substantial benefit from the nonprofit unless those benefits are 
received in furtherance of the organization’s exempt activities.319 In 
addition, upon dissolution of a nonprofit organization, the assets 
must be distributed in furtherance of an exempt purpose or to a 
federal or state government.320 
Professors Malani and Posner contend that the non-distribution 
constraint is not an essential element of qualifying for tax benefits, 
and that a for-profit entity can, by contract, simply promise not to 
distribute profits to managers or workers.321 The purpose of this 
would be to ensure that those running a for-profit charity would not 
have incentive to seek to increase profits for their own benefit by 
minimizing quality of goods and services.322 Further, Malani and 
Posner propose that an independent auditor be retained to police 
adherence to the contract, similar to the oversight the state attorney 
 
316  Model Legislation §305(c), available at 
http://benefitcorp.net/attorneys/model-legislation (a corporation may opt to 
provide standing to non-shareholders in it ts articles of incorporation or bylaws); for 
example, in Delaware only stockholders that individually or collectively own more 
than 2 percent of the outstanding shares or if listed on a national exchange, 2 
percent of shares, or shares with an vale of at least $2 million, can bring a legal claim 
to enforce the duty of the directors to balance the stakeholder interests. 
317  Model Legislation §301(a), available at 
http://benefitcorp.net/attorneys/model-legislation. 
318  26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.501(c)(3)- 1(c)(2). 
319  Id. 
320  26 C.F.R. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4). 
321  Malani & Posner, supra note 286, at 2034-35. 
322  Id. at 2037. 
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general or the Internal Revenue Service has over the nonprofit 
entity.323 These arguments, while not without some merit, are not 
effective in the context of Benefit Corporations as currently 
structured. 
A look at the Vermont Benefit Corporation statute is 
instructive.324 A review of the statute uncovers no limitations on the 
discretion of the directors in paying out the net profits of the 
corporation.325 Apart from the general fiduciary duties of corporate 
law on the action of directors, directors can allocate net profits as 
they think best.326 The way in which Benefit Corporation status can be 
terminated is also instructive. “A corporation whose status as a Benefit 
Corporation terminates shall immediately become subject to the 
obligations and rights of a general corporation.”327 As explained in 
Part II, this simply requires a two-thirds vote of shareholders.328 Upon 
termination or conversion back to a C Corporation, there is no 
requirement that proceeds be distributed in furtherance of a public 
purpose. On termination, such proceeds will revert to the 
shareholders, and upon conversion to a C Corporation these assets 
will presumably be rolled over into the C Corporation. Commenting 
on hybrid social enterprises, Professor Galle correctly points out that, 
“all of the existing forms can readily be converted into a standard 
corporation. . . .”329 
As hybrid entities that balance both profit and mission, Benefit 
Corporations are not required to limit their distributions in the 
manner dictated by Code §501(c)(3).330  Even if one were to agree 
 
323  Id. at 2036. 
324  See VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 11A, § 21 (2011). 
325  Id. 
326  Id. at § 21.09. 
327  Id. at § 21.02(a). 
328  Id. at § 21.07. 
329  Brain Galle, Social Enterprise: Who Needs It?, 54 B.C. LAW. REV. 2025, 2041 
(2013).  
330  See, e.g., Aurelien Loric, Designing a Legal Vehicle for Social Enterprises: An Issue 
Spotting Exercise, 5 COLUM. J. TAX L. 100 (2013-2014) (discussing the profit nature of 
the Benefit Corporation on behalf of its shareholders) (“Indeed, the Benefit 
Corporation allows the creation of double bottom line enterprises but does not 
require it: while a general public benefit purpose must exist, it does not have to be 
equal to the profitmaking purpose. Therefore, a Benefit Corporation can be turned 
primarily, although not exclusively, to profit maximization”).  
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with Malani and Posner that such statutory restrictions are not 
essential to effectively fulfilling social mission, it is clear that as 
currently drafted there is no evidence that Benefit Corporation 
legislation ensures that these entities effectively fulfill their general 
and/or specific public benefit purposes. As an entity that constantly 
juggles shareholder and stakeholder interests, a certain component 
of Benefit Corporation decision making will always be carried out 
with an eye to profit and monetary return to shareholders. As 
observed by Steve Munch, “[b]enefit corporations should seek profit. 
But absent limits on this goal, the corporation’s directors may still be 
subject to the real or imagined pressures of the market, and may thus 
occasionally privilege shareholder interests to the detriment of 
stakeholder positions.”331 Without distribution restrictions, the tax 
preference rationale based on the nonprofit’s limited ability to raise 
capital would cease to apply. Dana Brakman Reiser has aptly termed 
the need of a charity to focus on benefits provided to others and the 
restrictions on distributions as “other-regarding orientation.” She 
views this as an essential element of charity law.332 As currently 
drafted, the Benefit Corporation legislation fails this standard. 
3.     Awarding Nonprofit Tax Benefits to Benefit 
Corporations Would Undermine the Charitable Sector 
In 2013, there were at least 1.58 million nonprofits registered 
with the Internal Revenue Service, an increase of 21.5 percent since 
2001.333 However, charitable giving has not kept pace with the 
increased competition in the nonprofit sector, with charitable giving 
in 2012 only representing a four percent increase from 2011.334 The 
economic recession with its accompanying rising unemployment and 
shrinking discretionary income has resulted in fewer government and 
donor dollars available for the nonprofit sector.335 For example, in 
 
331  Munch, supra note 46, at 191. 
332  Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Law’s Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3 
(2011). 
333  Amy S. Blackwood, Katie L. Roeger, & Sarah Pettijohn, The Nonprofit Sector in 
Brief: Public Charities, Giving, and Volunteering, 2013, URBAN INSTITUTE available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412923-The-Nonprofit-Sector-in-Brief.pdf 
(last visited May 17, 2014).  
334  Id. 
335  Joseph J. Cordes, Re-thinking the Deduction for Charitable Contributions: 
Evaluating the Effects of Deficit-Reduction Proposals, 64 NATL. TAX J. 1001, 1021 (2011) 
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2008 overall individual charitable giving fell by 7 percent, and fell by 
6.2 percent in 2009.336 While charitable giving picked up by 2.1 
percent in 2010, researchers conducting an annual survey of 
charitable giving, Giving USA, suspect that increases in giving will 
continue at a modest rate through 2016, with some organizations 
seeing little chance of filling their budget gaps in the near future.337 
The nonprofit sector also faces possible threats to their long-
standing tax benefits, as recent economic tensions have caused some 
to question anew whether it is time for the nonprofit sector to 
sacrifice some level of tax benefits.338 For example, since 2009, the 
Obama administration has proposed to cap deductions allowable for 
contributions to charity at 28 percent, even though the top tax 
bracket at the time was 35 percent.339 The Center for Philanthropy at 
Indiana University estimated that this cap would result in a decrease 
in charitable giving of 1.3 percent.340  In the most recent budget 
proposal released in April, 2013, the administration once again has 
called for the cap of 28 percent, despite an increase in the highest tax 
rate to 39.6 percent.341 Extending nonprofit tax benefits to for-profit 
entities could further undermine the charitable sector.342 Due to the 
competition in the nonprofit sector, “greater entry by for-profits 
cannot be expected to enhance the degree of competition 
meaningfully, instead changing its nature to something less 
consistent with what is envisioned by granting public support to 
 
(outlining proposals advanced for change in the charitable contribution deduction). 
336  Id. 
337  Holly Hall and Heather Joslyn, Giving Recovery Lacks Momentum, Say Charities, 
CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY (Washington, D.C.) June 26, 2011, at 1. 
338  Cordes, supra note 335. 
339  Howard Husock, The Obama Budget Proposal: Tax Increase on Charity, FORBES, 
April 10, 2013, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/howardhusock/2013/04/10/the-obama-budget-
proposal-new-tax-on-charity/. 
340  The Center for Philanthropy at Indiana University, Impact of the Obama 
Administration’s Proposed Tax Policy changes on Itemized Charitable Giving, October, 2011, 
available at 
http://www.philanthropy.iupui.edu/files/research/obamataxchanges2011.pdf. 
341  Id. 
342  See, e.g., James R. Hines, Jill R. Horwitz & Austin Nichols, The Attack on 
Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1217 (2010). 
("Greater charitable activity by for-profits need not displace activities by noprofits, 
though that is a plausible outcome.”). 
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charity and its providers.”343 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In a time of increasing calls for corporate social responsibility, 
the hybrid corporate form of business seems to provide the ideal 
vehicle for allowing a socially minded entrepreneur the latitude to 
put social mission and stakeholders ahead of the financial bottom 
line for shareholders. The notion of joining for-profit and nonprofit 
motivation is not a new one, and in-fact, the evolution of the Benefit 
Corporation has been a gradual process. Even among those who 
agree on the positive social value of Benefit Corporations, a question 
remains as to whether these entities should also be extended the tax 
benefits enjoyed by nonprofit organizations. The failure of Benefit 
Corporations to fulfill the long-standing requirements of nonprofit 
organizations and the lack of carefully articulated standards to assess 
fulfillment of social mission lead to the conclusion that Benefit 
Corporations, as currently designed, do not warrant special tax 
treatment. 
 
 
343  Id. at 1219. 
